Thursday, March 25, 2010

Sherman in MEQ reviews Gelvin's "The Israel-Palestine Conflict"


















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The Israel-Palestine
Conflict
One Hundred Years of
War


by James L. Gelvin
New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007. 209 pp. $75 ($23.99, paper).
Buy this book at Amazon

Reviewed
by Martin Sherman


Middle East
Quarterly

Winter 2010


http://www.meforum.org/2609/the-israel-palestine-conflict







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Gelvin, professor of Middle Eastern history
at the University of California, Los Angeles, has produced an account of
the Israel-Palestine conflict which is appallingly shallow, shoddy, and
slanted. The following excerpt epitomizes the book's blatant bias:



when the Israelis attempted to organize the
Palestinians of the occupied territories into collaborating "village
leagues" in the early 1980s, the PLO could only react defensively,
assassinating those who collaborated.


This novel notion of "defensive
assassination" characterizes the overriding tenor that pervades Gelvin's
portrayal of the conflict. For it stands to reason that if
assassinations by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) are to be
denoted "defensive," they must be in response to an "offensive" of some
kind. Presumably then, the offensive that precipitated the defensive
assassinations was Israel's attempt to find collaborating—or should that
be "cooperative"—Palestinians with whom it might be possible to reach an
agreed modus vivendi against the wishes of the PLO. In other words,
Israel's attempt to enter into dialog with Palestinians other than the
PLO constituted aggression that could only be met with defensive
fratricide?


This sums up Gelvin's approach to the
conflict. Any Israeli measure, however peaceable, is objectionable,
meriting censure or even sanction while any Palestinian measure, however
brutal, is worthy of understanding, even support.


This bias in Gelvin's presentation of events
runs throughout his book. Typically, he glosses over the gruesome
details of Palestinian terror and, in dwelling on the Israeli responses,
he gives the impression that these responses were unprovoked acts of
callous cynicism and cunning. Thus, in describing Ariel Sharon's
decision to launch "Operation Defensive Shield" in 2002, Gelvin neglects
to point out that this was preceded by a wave of murderous Palestinian
terror, culminating in the horror of the Park Hotel Passover massacre.
Was it ignorance, shoddy research, or purposeful design that caused him
to omit any mention of the incident, which was a seminal event in
shaping public consciousness in Israel and in precipitating the demand
for tougher measures against the Palestinian terror?


Gelvin leads the reader to believe that it
was more the post-9/11 climate in Washington than Palestinian terror and
the public mood in Israel that enabled Sharon to undertake the
wide-ranging response against the terror organizations in the West Bank.
The reader is thus left with the thinly disguised implication that the
Bush administration's war on terror provided the opportunity for Sharon
to unleash with glee the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on the
Palestinians.


This severely distorted version of events
totally ignores the fact that for close to a year Sharon had resolutely
refused to undertake any retaliatory measures against the Palestinians
despite mounting public pressure to respond to continuing terror
atrocities; he doggedly adhered to his policy of "restraint is
strength." Then came the carnage at the Park Hotel in which thirty Jews
were killed while attending a Passover meal, making further restraint
untenable.


Gelvin's bias is further exposed in his
reference to the IDF operation in Jenin with a perfunctory acceptance of
the initial—and subsequently discredited—characterization by the U.N.
envoy of the aftermath of the fighting in Jenin as "horrific beyond
belief."[1] Would it be too much to
expect Gelvin to note that the now generally accepted figure of
Palestinians killed in Jenin, around fifty, most of whom were armed
combatants, is the same as the number of Israeli civilians killed in the
two terror attacks—the Dolphinarium and the Park Hotel—that marked the
beginning and end of the Sharon "restraint is strength" policy? Surely
that too was "horrific beyond belief?"


Similarly it seems that in the interests of
balance, Gelvin deemed it unnecessary to mention that twenty-three
Israeli soldiers were killed in the fighting (obviously not by unarmed
civilians), a high fatality toll incurred by Israel's decision not to
use its air force in order to minimize noncombatant Palestinian
casualties. Neither worthy of mention are the reports—such as those in
Time magazine—that many of the "horrific" scenes in Jenin were
the result of "exploding booby traps with which Palestinian fighters had
honeycombed the camp."[2]


But perhaps the feature of Gelvin's book that
deserves particular note is the almost total absence of references. He
makes far-reaching claims about contested events without providing
source materials to indicate the basis for these claims. Virtually the
only references are to obscure anecdotal texts or Palestinian poems,
which Gelvin employs in an attempt to authenticate some of his creative
versions of historical events. This lack of referencing is a grave
defect for what is allegedly an academic endeavor.


Thus for example, Gelvin repeatedly accuses
Israel of depriving the Palestinians of water, as well as of devastating
their agriculture and degrading their infrastructures. These claims are
grossly at odds with the facts. Gelvin's accusation that Israelis living
on the West Bank "siphoned off scarce water resources to nourish lawns
and fill swimming pools" ignores the fact that the Israel Water
Authority conveys more water from pre-1967 Israel into the territories
than the Israeli settlements located there use.[3] There is thus an overall net inflow of water from
Israel to the Palestinians. While it is true that on a per capita basis
the consumption of water by Israelis is much higher than that of the
Palestinian population, this is principally a result of differences in
demand (rather than supply) and is due to differences in lifestyles.
Similarly different rates of consumption occur between the Jewish and
Arab populations within pre-1967 Israel—and between different
socioeconomic groups within the Jewish population—without anyone raising
the claim that this is the result of purposeful deprivation. With regard
to stoppages (which also regularly occur in Arab capitals such as Amman
and Damascus), these are almost exclusively initiated by Palestinian
providers—which are the entities supplied by the Israeli water utility,
and which deliver the water to the final consumers. Typically these
stoppages are due to theft, poor infrastructure maintenance, or unpaid
bills.


With regard to urban usage, the Palestinian
household consumption of water rose dramatically under Israeli rule—by
almost 600 percent from 1967 to 1989,[4] a significantly higher rate of increase than in
Israel where domestic consumption in the same period rose by
approximately 230 percent.[5] Total
freshwater consumption by the Palestinians rose by 300 percent in the
period 1967-2006—from 60 to 180 million cubic meter (mcm)—while Israeli
freshwater use actually declined from 1,411 to 1,211 mcm in the same
period—a decrease made possible by an increased use of recycled sewage
for agriculture and desalinated water for domestic use.[6]


Perhaps even more outrageous, Gelvin
charges—again, without indicating sources—that "Israeli agricultural
policies have so devastated Palestinian agriculture that less land was
under cultivation in 1987 than had been in 1947." One can only wonder on
what possible basis he makes this claim, for it grossly contradicts
official Israeli figures, according to which the overall area under
cultivation increased by 160 percent while agricultural output increased
12-fold in the period 1967-89. This was facilitated by the adoption of
modern, water-efficient irrigation techniques such as sprinklers and
drip irrigation by Palestinian farmers, instead of open channel or
rain-fed irrigation systems that were prevalent in these areas before
Israeli administration. And while one may express skepticism at
unquestioning acceptance of official government statistics, they are
certainly preferable to assertions based on unsourced data. Furthermore
the official version receives strong scholarly corroboration from
experts such as Daniel Hillel, in his wide-ranging study of the Middle
East water resources, Rivers of Eden, a book distinctly
empathetic to the Arab world. In it, Hillel makes the following
observation:



The Israeli occupation changed local
agriculture profoundly. It introduced modern technology, including
mechanization, precision tillage, pest control, plastic covering of
crops for temperature control, high yielding varieties, postharvest
processing of produce, marketing, and export outlets. It also
introduced efficient methods of irrigation, including sprinkler and
especially drip irrigation. Consequently, output increased greatly,
and farming was transformed from a subsistence enterprise to a
commercial industry.[7]


Devastated Palestinian agriculture? It would
seem that Gelvin has gotten it wrong—even backwards. For he further
claims that "Israeli investment policy … wreaked havoc on [Palestinian]
infrastructure." This may cause one to wonder what infrastructure he
refers to here since in the pre-1967 West Bank—because of purposeful
Jordanian policy—there was very little modern infrastructure upon which
to wreak any havoc at all.


Indeed, Gelvin's allegation sits uneasily
with the fact that out of the roughly 450 towns and villages in Judea
and Samaria only 50 were connected to a running water system in June
1967, whereas the number rose to 260 by October 1991. Likewise, Israel
extended its electrical grid to supply the Palestinians, as Gelvin
himself observes. However, even this he finds a matter for reproach
since to his mind this is a merely another instrument of Israeli control
over the Palestinians. Thus, Israel is damned if it does and damned if
it doesn't.


Indeed, this querulous attitude is difficult
to fathom. For if peaceful coexistence between Israel and the
Palestinians is feasible, surely such shared infrastructures could only
bolster stability. And in light of Israel's clear advantage in both
scale and technology, it would seem only logical that it should supply
the Palestinians (rather than the other way round) to allow them to
benefit from the economy of scale and enjoy cheaper rates and greater
reliability of supply. On the other hand, if such peaceful coexistence
is not feasible, is Gelvin suggesting that Israel should facilitate
independent power generation in a hostile entity to drive the lathes
that fabricate the weapons that would be used against it?


But perhaps more disconcerting than the
baseless nonsense that comprises the content of Gelvin's book is the
fact that a prestigious academic press such as Cambridge University
Press published it. Quite apart from the questionable veracity of many
of the positions expounded; quite apart from the fact that many of these
positions would be hotly disputed by many mainstream authorities; quite
apart from the fact that such dissenting opinions are not even
mentioned, never mind debated, it is the virtually total absence of any
references substantiating these positions that makes the book closer to
a work of fiction than to a serious academic study.


No less disturbing is the lavish praise
heaped upon it by colleagues. One can only shake one's head in
disbelief, dismay, and despair when in a review in Foreign
Affairs
, L. Carl Brown, professor in foreign affairs emeritus at
Princeton University, deems it "[b]alanced, fair … a fine historical
synthesis" and an "academic textbook at its best."[8]


In the final analysis, however, this book
should be read, not in spite of all it faults but because of them. For
although it is unlikely to contribute in any way to an enhanced
understanding of the Israel-Palestine conflict, it will certainly
underscore the mendacious manner in which this topic is dealt with in
mainstream academe.



Martin Sherman is visiting
Schusterman Scholar at the University of Southern California/Hebrew
Union College. He lectures at Tel Aviv University.


[1] BBC
News
, Apr. 18,
2002
.
[2] "The Battle of
Jenin
," Time, accessed Sept. 16, 2009.
[3] "Aspkat Hamaim Mechevrat Mekorot le'Yehuda v'Shomron
v'Bikat Ha'Yarden—v' Mekor Ha'Maim Ha'Mesupakim," Mekorot, Israel Water
Corporations, 2008.
[4] "The
Activities of the Civil Administration in the Territories: Statistical
Fact Sheet," Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 16, 1994.
[5] Zvi Grunwald, Water in Israel
1962-1989
(Tel Aviv: Water Allocation Department, Israel Water
Commission, 1989), p. 64; Doch al Nihul Meshek Hamaim (Jerusalem:
Israel State Comptroller, Government Press Office, 1990), p. 32.
[6] The
Issue of Water between Israel and the Palestinians
(Tel Aviv:
The Israel Water Authority, 2009), accessed Oct. 26, 2009.
[7] Daniel Hillel, Rivers of Eden:
The Struggle for Water and the Quest for Peace in the Middle East

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 206.
[8] "Capsule
Reviews
," Foreign Affairs, June 2006; The Israel-Palestine
Conflict: One Hundred Years of War
, book jacket.


Related Topics: Arab-Israel
conflict & diplomacy
Martin Sherman
Winter
2010 MEQ
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