|
|
|
Join UANI
Top
Stories
NYT:
"Behind President Obama's decision on Friday to extend the Iran
nuclear negotiations for four more months is a calculation that the
administration has the mix of pressure and incentives just about right:
That by keeping the most damaging sanctions, but giving Tehran a taste of
what access to its overseas cash reserves might mean, a deal is possible.
Congress, and some nuclear experts pushing for a harder line, strongly
disagree. It was overwhelming sanctions, and the pressure of covert
action against Iran's nuclear program, that brought the country to the
table, they argue. To get a final deal, they contend, the formula is
simple: More sanctions, more pressure, and behind it all the lurking
threat of military action... Mr. Zarif, in an interview, argued that the
sanctions Congress is so proud of have been counterproductive. Before
they began in earnest, he said, Iran had 200 centrifuges installed in its
facilities; now it has 22,000. More pressure, he contended, will only
drive Iran's leadership to more defiance. Some in the Obama
administration agree, saying there is a 'sweet spot' in sanctions where
the continuing, gnawing pressure of oil, gas and financial sanctions,
which they vowed Friday night to continue, would take their toll, and the
prospect of relief would create political pressure in Tehran for a deal.
But Gary Samore, President Obama's former top adviser on eliminating
weapons of mass destruction, took a harder line on Friday night. Now the
president of United Against Nuclear Iran, an advocacy group, Mr. Samore
and the organization's chief executive, Mark D. Wallace, argued that to
get the leverage the administration needs it must 'make clear that Iran
remains closed for business and that the uncertainty surrounding these
nuclear negotiations makes the business climate in Iran far too risky'
for Western capital to re-enter. And, they contended, the negotiating
partners should go farther and 'agree on decisive sanctions that would
constitute a virtual economic blockade of Iran should Iran fail to agree
to an acceptable deal' in the next four months." http://t.uani.com/1wQm4L1
NYT:
"Iran, the United States and the five other countries negotiating
the future of the Iranian nuclear program have agreed to a four-month
extension of the talks, giving them more time to try to bridge major
differences over whether Tehran will be forced to dismantle parts of its
nuclear infrastructure, according to a statement released early Saturday
in Vienna by all seven nations. The extension was expected, but some
American officials say that even the additional time may not prove
sufficient. The original deadline for an accord was Sunday, though a
temporary agreement that has been in effect since November had envisioned
a six-month extension. Secretary of State John Kerry said that under the
extension, Iran would get access to $2.8 billion in assets that have been
frozen in the United States, but sanctions against oil sales and other
major sources of income would not be lifted. 'Let me be clear,' Mr. Kerry
said in a statement, 'Iran will not get any more money during these four
months than it did during the last six months, and the vast majority of
its frozen oil revenues will remain inaccessible.' Iran, in return, has
agreed to dilute additional stocks of material or turn it into reactor
fuel. Once the material is made into the metal plates that fit into its
research reactor, it is extremely difficult to turn it into bomb-grade
fuel." http://t.uani.com/1rDJF1c
LAT:
"When Iran and the world powers trying to negotiate a nuclear deal
announced late Friday that they would extend their five-month-old talks
for an additional four months, they said they had been making 'tangible
progress' toward a deal. But a former member of President Obama's inner
circle on the Iran issue says Iran is actually moving further from the
six world powers on the most important issue of all: how much uranium
enrichment capacity the Islamic Republic will be entitled to retain.
Robert Einhorn, who was a special advisor on arms control at the State
Department until May 2013, says the Iranians have been quietly extending
what they claim they are entitled to on enrichment -- what Einhorn calls
'rights creep.' He warns these demands could gridlock the negotiations...
Instead of cutting back its capacity to a fraction of what it is today,
as the six are now demanding, it wants to keep operating all the machines
that are now producing; pursue unlimited research and development; limit
the duration of the deal to eight years or less; and be free to expand to
industrial scale once the deal lapses. If Iran sticks to these demands
when talks resume, 'it will ensure continued deadlock,' Einhorn
warned." http://t.uani.com/WqrAJm
Nuclear Program & Negotiations
Reuters:
"Iran faced Western pressure on Saturday to make concessions over
its atomic activities after it and six world powers failed to meet a July
20 deadline for a deal to end the decade-old dispute but agreed to keep
talking... 'These few months until November could be the last and best
chance for a long time to end the nuclear argument peacefully,' German
Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said. 'Iran must show it is
willing to dispel all doubts about the peaceful nature of its nuclear
program,' he said." http://t.uani.com/WyvqQT
Sanctions
Relief
WSJ:
"China imported a record amount of crude oil from Iran in the first
half of the year amid a loosening of U.S. sanctions, further increasing
the importance of Middle East supplies for the world's No. 2 economy...
Chinese customs data Monday showed that Iranian oil imports in the first
six months of 2014 were 630,000 barrels a day, up 48% from the same
period last year. That is the most crude China has ever imported from
Iran in any first half in history, according to Li Li, head of research
and analytics at consultancy ICIS C1 Energy. Iran now represents about
10% of China's foreign crude purchases in the first half. Maziar Hojjati,
managing director of the China office of National Iranian Oil Co., or
NIOC, said he believes the easing of U.S. sanctions has contributed to
the surge in imports. 'The American government has put less pressure on
the Chinese due to a deal between Iran and the West,' Mr. Hojjati said.
'There is an opportunity to export more to the Chinese market.'" http://t.uani.com/1mw8R4r
Bloomberg:
"Iran's oil exports will remain near the highest level in two years
as talks with six global powers over the Persian Gulf state's nuclear
program are extended for four more months, according to six analysts in a
survey. Sales of crude and condensates by Iran to six main buyers
averaged 1.27 million barrels a day in the first six months of the year,
according to data compiled by Bloomberg from customs statistics and
International Energy Agency estimates. Shipments will stay near that
level in the second half, according to the analysts Bloomberg surveyed on
July 16 and 17. 'Iran's going to want oil exports to keep edging up, and
the U.S. has been willing to allow some wiggle room,' Robin Mills, an
analyst at Manaar Energy Consulting & Project Management, said by
phone from Dubai yesterday." http://t.uani.com/1nNtGZh
Sanctions
Enforcement & Impact
WSJ:
"Sanctions have nearly halved Iran's petroleum export revenue in the
past two years, OPEC data showed Friday, as the impact of international
restrictions on its oil deepens... In its annual statistical report, the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries said revenue generated
by Iranian petroleum exports fell to $61.92 billion in 2013, down 46% from
$114.75 billion in 2011. International sanctions banning sales of Iranian
oil to the European Union and limiting them in Asia cut the country's
petroleum exports by 42% in 2013 compared with the previous year. Though
oil sales had already fallen in 2012, the drop in volumes had been
largely compensated by higher oil prices." http://t.uani.com/1mw92MZ
Terrorism
Free Beacon:
"American adversaries in the Middle East continue to work together
across sectarian and religious divides to harm U.S. interests and
security, requiring a more nuanced response from U.S. officials to
address the turmoil in the region, experts say... Iran, led by a Shiite
government, is typically viewed as opposing hardline Sunni groups such as
the Taliban and al Qaeda as part of an intra-religious dispute among
Muslims. However, Iran has a long history of harboring and supporting al
Qaeda. European intelligence reports indicate that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,
founder of the group al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) that eventually morphed into
ISIL, operated from Iran after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.
Zarqawi used protection from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
to rebuild the terrorist group's network and prepare for its expansion
into Iraq. The U.S. Treasury Department has called Iran 'a critical
transit point for funding to support al Qaeda's activities in Afghanistan
and Pakistan.' The department in February sanctioned three IRGC officers
for allegedly providing support to the Taliban as well as to a senior
member of al Qaeda who allegedly used Iran to move Sunni fighters into
Syria. 'Iran has a long history of fomenting violent conflict and
inflaming sectarian divides throughout the Middle East including in
Lebanon, Syria and Iraq,' said the group United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI)
in recent press release. 'Depictions of Iran as a source of stability are
therefore erroneous and short-sighted, as are assertions that increased
Iranian involvement in Iraq will serve American and Iraqi interests,'
UANI added." http://t.uani.com/1sEE7Gd
Reuters:
"Pope Francis called for justice to be served in his native
Argentina on Friday, the twentieth anniversary of the deadly bombing of a
Buenos Aires Jewish commuity center that local courts blamed on Iran.
Investigations into the attack in which an explosives-laden truck
exploded outside the Argentine Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA)
building, killing 85, have advanced little in two decades. No suspect has
ever been detained or taken to court. 'We tend to archive things in order
not to burden ourselves with history, with suffering,' the pope said in a
video address in Spanish that was screened during an anniversary event
organized by the Jewish community in Buenos Aires. 'Today, together with
my solidarity and my prayers for all the victims comes my desire for
justice. May justice be done!'" http://t.uani.com/1wQvKoQ
Human Rights
NYT:
"The mother of Amir Hekmati, an American of Iranian descent
imprisoned in Tehran for nearly three years, has written to President
Obama, asking him to 'please remember my Amir' in the negotiations with
Iran over its disputed nuclear program. The letter from the mother,
Behnaz Hekmati, appeared timed to convey the family's wish that the
United States use its leverage in the nuclear talks to win his release...
The incarceration of Mr. Hekmati, a former Marine from Flint, Mich., who
turns 31 this month, has been festering as an irritant in the estranged
relationship between Iran and the United States. His family had harbored
hopes a year ago that he would be freed after the election of President
Hassan Rouhani, who wants improved relations, but that optimism proved
premature." http://t.uani.com/1pvaJxg
Trend:
"A local court in Iran's northern Mazandaran province has sentenced
a defendant to death by stoning. The head of Qaem Shahr city judiciary,
Javad Borhani said that the 32-year old defendant has been sentenced to
death by stoning, hanging and 15 years imprisonment, Iran's Mehr News
Agency reported. The person is charged with such crimes as adultery,
rape, possessing of weapons, alcohol and satellite receiver equipments,
the official said." http://t.uani.com/1u7OmEN
Opinion &
Analysis
UANI Advisory
Board Member Sen. Joseph Lieberman in Reuters:
"Rather than being a defeat for the United States, a refusal to accept
a bad deal in Vienna could strengthen the Obama administration at home
and abroad. It would help rebuild its bruised credibility and influence
in the Middle East and hopefully increase the odds that the
administration can ultimately achieve the goal of peacefully, verifiably
bolting the door on Iran's illicit nuclear ambitions. If the talks in
Vienna end in failure because of Iranian intransigence, it should be seen
as a foreign policy success for the Obama administration on multiple
levels. First, by holding firm on key issues under dispute, the
administration can start to unwind a corrosive narrative about its global
leadership. A perception has built up over the past year among many of
our friends and partners - especially in the Middle East - that the White
House is so averse to the prospect of foreign entanglements that it is
willing to shirk both historic U.S. security commitments and its own
explicit policy pledges. This suspicion has been fed by administration
missteps elsewhere, in particular the last- minute shift against the use
of military force against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad after he used
chemical weapons against his own people. In the case of Iran, these
suspicions have led many to fear that the Obama administration's
declaration that 'no deal is better than a bad deal' will prove no more
enduring than its 'red line' against Assad. By sticking to its principles
at Vienna, the White House can counter this belief - and reestablish that
it means what it says. Second, the White House has said the only reason
the Iranians have come to the negotiating table is because of crippling
economic pressure imposed on them. Much of the credit for that pressure
goes to Congress, which repeatedly pushed the previous two
administrations to accept more severe sanctions, more quickly, than the
executive branch wanted. The Obama administration made critical
contributions to making sanctions work and has shown unambiguously,
through its persistent diplomacy, that responsibility for the
confrontation rests exclusively with leaders in Tehran, not Washington.
This has made it far harder for ambivalent countries to oppose sanctions.
In the wake of a deadlock in Vienna, the Obama administration should
seize on this dynamic. This would mean determining quickly if a new
United Nations Security Council resolution is achievable, which would
impose tangible costs on Tehran for its refusal to accept the good-faith
offers made by the international community. It also would mean working in
parallel with our key allies and partners in Europe and Asia-Pacific to
prepare multilateral measures that could be deployed against Tehran, as
we have done successfully before. And it would mean that the Obama
administration should make clear its readiness to embrace congressional
legislation imposing a new level of sanctions... We should remember that
one way Iran wins is if it is able to divide the diverse coalition of
countries and interests that has mobilized against it - to drive a wedge
between the United States and its foreign partners; between Democrats and
Republicans in Washington, and between Congress and the executive branch.
Conversely, the way to defeat Iran's nuclear ambitions is by standing
united, both at home and abroad." http://t.uani.com/1p7rj7U
Robert Einhorn in
Brookings: "Iran has insisted that it must have
sufficient enrichment capacity to produce enriched fuel for the Bushehr
nuclear power reactor when the Russia-Iran contract to supply fuel for
that Russian-built reactor expires in 2021. That would require Iran to
expand its current enrichment capacity by a factor of ten or more and
would reduce the amount of time it would need to produce enough
weapons-grade uranium for a bomb to a matter of a few weeks, should it
decide to do so. The United States and its P5+1 partners have called for
a sharp reduction of Iran's current enrichment capacity (i.e., around
19,000 centrifuges, less than 10,000 of them operating) - to perhaps a
few thousand first-generation centrifuges or a smaller number of more
advanced centrifuges. They point out that such a limited enrichment
capacity would nonetheless enable Iran to meet its realistic, near-term
practical needs for enriched uranium - to provide enriched fuel for the
Tehran Research Reactor, a modified Arak reactor, and perhaps a small
light-water research reactor - and that Russia is eager to continue
supplying fuel for Bushehr beyond 2021 (and could do so reliably and more
competently, cheaply and safely than Iran could do on its own). This gap
has been apparent for several months, but seemed to widen when Supreme
Leader Khamenei stated, in a July 7 speech, that Iran has a 'definite
need' for 190,000 SWUs - or 'separative work units,' a measure of
centrifuge performance equivalent to well over 100,000 first-generation
centrifuges or smaller numbers of more advanced centrifuges. Ali-Akbar
Salehi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, elaborated the
following day that new-generation centrifuges would be tested,
mass-produced, and phased in over the next eight years so that, by the
scheduled expiration of the Russia-Iran fuel supply contract in 2021,
Iran would be able to produce the 190,000 SWUs the Supreme Leader said
was necessary to fuel Bushehr. The evolution of Iranian positions on
enrichment might be called 'rights creep.' For several years, while the
United States held that no enrichment program should be permitted in
Iran, the Iranians argued that a central negotiating goal was simply
gaining recognition of a 'right to enrich.' Although the United States
still does not recognize a 'right to enrich,' it agreed last year that,
in the context of an otherwise acceptable deal, Iran could pursue a
limited enrichment program. Having won that major concession, the
Iranians have begun talking as if the ability to produce sufficient
enriched uranium independently to fuel its power reactors - a capability
even advanced nuclear-energy state Japan does not possess - is a right
and minimum requirement that must be guaranteed and exercised. They now
seem to be reaching even further, arguing that they must have that
capability in place by 2021. In an interview with The New York Times a
week ago, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif revealed some elements of
his government's position that were presumably intended to be seen as
movement toward the P5+1, particularly the notion that Iran would not
insist on ramping up its enrichment capacity right away, but would defer
an expansion for a number of years and in the meantime would remain at
current centrifuge levels. But Zarif's comments, together with those of
the Supreme Leader and Salehi, suggest an Iranian strategy on the
enrichment issue that is sharply at odds with the approach of the United
States and its partners... If Iran pursues such an approach when the
talks resume, it will not be acceptable, certainly not to the United
States and several of its partners, and it will ensure continued
deadlock. Iranian officials like to say that the United States and its
P5+1 partners must show greater 'realism' - meaning Western negotiators
must accept the reality of Iran's declared nuclear plans. But it is Iran
that must show greater realism if it truly wants the negotiations to
succeed and sanctions to be removed. The Iranian approach fails the
realism test at several levels. Iran has no compelling need to produce
fuel indigenously for the Bushehr power reactor post-2021. The Russians
are more than happy to extend their fuel supply contract for the life of
the reactor, and to provide fuel for any additional reactors that Iran
buys from Russia. Citing disappointing past experience - especially the
failure of the 'Eurodif' enriched uranium consortium to meet its
obligations to Iran - Tehran asserts that it cannot afford to rely on
foreign suppliers and must ensure independence in fuel production. But Russia
has proven to be a reliable partner to Iran for decades, defying strong
U.S. pressure to abandon the Bushehr project. And even if Iran does not
trust Russia or the well-supplied enriched uranium buyers' market, it can
pursue a variety of means to ensure against a fuel-supply disruption,
including purchasing from Russia a continually renewable, five-year
supply of spare fuel that could be stored on Iranian territory. Iran is
also not being realistic about its ability to take over Bushehr fuel
production from Russia in 2021. As Carnegie Endowment nuclear expert Mark
Hibbs points out in the July 7 Iran Fact File, 'Iran has no experience
and no infrastructure for making commercially significant quantities of
VVER [Bushehr's reactor type] fuel and no intellectual property agreement
with Russia giving Iran access to design data for core internals
including fuel, which it would need to make the fuel by itself. Were Iran
to go ahead without Russian cooperation, a bilateral agreement assigning
Russia liability in the case of safety issues arising at Bushehr would be
automatically terminated.' So Iran's declared plan to produce Bushehr
fuel independently by 2021 is not only unnecessary and uneconomical, it
is also technically unfeasible, legally questionable, and highly
unrealistic in terms of timeframe. If Iran somehow managed on its own to
fabricate and load fuel into Bushehr, major safety issues could
arise." http://t.uani.com/1o05bwM
Samih Maaytah in
Asharq Al Awsat: "When we talk about a possible
agreement between Iran and the P5 +1, not only are we talking about a
technical military agreement regarding the Iranian nuclear program, but
we are also implicitly engaging with Iran's expansionist ambitions, which
are part and parcel of its foreign policy. It is this expansionism, in
the context of Iran's nuclear program, that raises concerns in Israel and
the West. But these concerns do not include fears of Israel being wiped
off the map or Iran championing Arab interests in Palestine. Iran is not
interested in developing a full nuclear program. Rather, it wants to
control certain levers of power that will allow it to realize its
expansionist ambitions. Its incomplete nuclear program is one of these
levers, as is Hezbollah, which has high levels of influence in Lebanon,
on Israel's northern border. Iran is aware that expanding its influence
in the region requires posing a risk, albeit theoretically, to Israel.
This means doing some saber-rattling and calling for the liberalization
of Arab land, but in reality its aim is to force the major powers to
placate Iran by ceding to its demands on regional issues. This allows
Iran to interfere in the Gulf and even infringe upon those countries'
internal affairs. Coming to an agreement on the nuclear program is not,
in and of itself, a goal for Iran. Resolving the matter through a
definitive agreement does not advance Iran's expansionist platform. This
is because the nuclear program must remain a tool Iran can use to exert
pressure and further its wider interests. Iraq, for example, occupies a
special place in Iranian foreign policy. It will be decades before it has
disentangled itself from Iraq's internal affairs. Iran, which aligned
itself militarily with the United States on the 2003 invasion of Iraq,
has achieved a remarkable amount of influence in that country. But the
situation in Iraq has now changed, to the detriment of Tehran. Iraq has
relapsed into chaos and its Sunni minority has reclaimed some clout, and
Iran continues to engage with the Iraqi Kurds and their ambitions for
statehood. Then there's Syria, where Iran has waged war as though its own
existence depended on the outcome. It has provided extensive financial
support to the Syrian regime and has dispatched advisors with field
experience in Iraq. It continues to exploit the presence of the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in its fight against opposition forces.
This has all been done in order to preserve Iranian influence, which
would suffer a fatal blow if the Syrian regime-its key ally-were to fall.
Tehran knows that change in Syria means a change in the landscape in
Lebanon. This in turn would affect Hezbollah's influence and increase the
strength of those opposed to Iranian expansionism. If Iran becomes mired
in political and military conflicts on two fronts-Syria and Iraq-its
influence will be threatened, just as it lost influence along the
Lebanese-Israeli border when Hezbollah committed to Security Council
Resolution 1701. Iran's commitment to the Syrian regime has weakened its
relationship with Hamas, which has taken an anti-regime stance after
having previously benefited from the regime's political and security
cover. Iran is aware that the most important aspects of its expansionist
toolkit are located close to the Israeli border. It must be close geographically,
through Hezbollah and Hamas, and close politically, through the influence
of its nuclear program. This is why I do not foresee any future agreement
between the major powers and Iran regarding its nuclear program-not
because the agreement would be difficult to reach, but because Tehran
wants the project to act as a platform from which it can advance its
interests in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, the Gulf, and elsewhere in the region.
Iran wants to force the international community to accept that it will always
be a presence on the regional stage. This is why Iran will draw out the
talks for years and years, until, finally, negotiations reach an impasse.
All the while, it will have been pursuing its actual goals." http://t.uani.com/1rvQXGx
|
|
Eye on Iran is a periodic news summary from United Against
Nuclear Iran (UANI) a program of the American Coalition Against Nuclear
Iran, Inc., a tax-exempt organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code. Eye on Iran is not intended as a comprehensive
media clips summary but rather a selection of media elements with
discreet analysis in a PDA friendly format. For more information please
email Press@UnitedAgainstNuclearIran.com
United Against Nuclear
Iran (UANI) is a non-partisan, broad-based coalition that is united in a
commitment to prevent Iran from fulfilling its ambition to become a
regional super-power possessing nuclear weapons. UANI is an
issue-based coalition in which each coalition member will have its own
interests as well as the collective goal of advancing an Iran free of
nuclear weapons.
|
|
|
Posts
No comments:
Post a Comment