Saturday, January 24, 2015

The Long War Journal (Site-Wide)


The Long War Journal (Site-Wide)



Posted: 24 Jan 2015 09:50 AM PST
When announcing the US strategy to "degrade and ultimately destroy" the Islamic State in both Iraq and Syria, President Barack Obama said he would model it after America's counterterrorism strategy in Somalia and Yemen, "one that we have successfully pursued...for years."
Immediately after Obama's speech, we at The Long War Journal questioned the wisdom of describing Somalia and Yemen as "successfully pursued" counterterrorism operations. Al Qaeda's official branches, Shabaab in Somalia and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, remain entrenched in their respective countries, despite some setbacks here and there. AQAP's core leadership cadre is intact. And both al Qaeda branches continue to control territory while working to conduct attacks outside of their countries. [For details, see LWJ report, US strategy against Islamic State to mirror counterterrorism efforts in Yemen, Somalia.]
In the four plus months since Obama described Yemen as a successful engagement, things have gone from bad to worse. The Iranian-backed Shiite Houthis have broken out from the northern provinces and overran the capital. Just this week, President Hadi, who was perhaps America's greatest ally on the Arabian Peninsula as he actively endorsed and facilitated US counterterrorism operations, including controversial drone strikes against AQAP, was forced to step down. The prime minister has also resigned and the government has dissolved.
During this timeframe, the US drone program against AQAP has stalled. The last US drone strike in Yemen that has been confirmed by The Long War Journal took place on Nov. 12, 2014. This is especially remarkable given that AQAP has claimed credit for the assault on Charlie Hebdo's offices in Paris, and the terrorists themselves said that AQAP sent them.
Unsurprisingly, US officials are now telling Reuters that counterterrorism operations in Yemen are "paralyzed" with the collapse of the Hadi government (the long gap in strikes in the face of the Charlie Hebdo attack is a clear indication that US CT operations are in limbo). Yemen's military is also said to be in disarray.
If US officials expect the Houthis to be willing participants against AQAP, they are mistaken. The Houthis, while enemies of AQAP, are no friends of the US. While their movement was not created by Iran, they have adopted the Iranians' motto: "Death to America." Additionally, any action against AQAP only serves to strengthen the Houthis, and by extension, Iran.
Meanwhile, without a central government and effective military, Sunnis may be tempted to back AQAP against the Shiite Houthis, thereby increasing AQAP's recruiting pool. There is already evidence that this is happening.
If this is what a successful counterterrorism strategy looks like, we'd hate to see failure.
Posted: 24 Jan 2015 09:56 AM PST
It is very rare that I read an editorial on a subject that I am deeply vested in and agree with every point made. Dawn, the Pakistani newspaper, hit the nail square on the head with an editorial, titled "Banned or not?". The paper asks the hard questions about whether the Pakistani government has really banned the Haqqani network and Jamaat-ud-Dawa. [For LWJ's analysis on this subject, see: Reported ban of Haqqani Network unlikely to end Pakistan's support of group, and Pakistan falsely claims it takes 'immediate action' against terror groups listed by the UN.]
The editorial is reproduced in full, below. Keep in mind that asking tough questions about the Pakistani state's duplicity with respect to terrorist groups requires quite a bit of courage in that country. The Long War Journal is banned in Pakistan to this day for noting Pakistan's good-vs-bad Taliban problem, as well as exposing other issues. But that is a small price to pay. Brave and insightful journalists, such as Asia Times reporter Syed Saleem Shahzad, have been tortured and brutally murdered for questioning the Pakistani state and its links to the Taliban and other jihadist groups.
Kudos to Dawn for its cogent editorial.
IT ought to be a straightforward answer to a simple question: has the Pakistani state taken any measures in recent weeks against, among others, the Haqqani network and Jamaatud Dawa that impact on the legal and operational status of those groups on Pakistani soil?
Unhappily, even in this most straightforward of cases, the Pakistani state is being anything but direct and honest.
The Foreign Office tells the media to check with the Interior Ministry and Nacta; the otherwise voluble and media-attention-loving Interior Minister Nisar Ali Khan goes silent; anonymous bureaucrats and unnamed officials give contradictory statements; parliament is given ambiguous answers to direct questions; and nowhere does anyone in any relevant public office show any inclination to inform the public of what is or is not being done in their name.
Meanwhile, the conspiracy theories are growing more feverish: an outright ban, frozen bank accounts, restrictions on foreign travel of JuD leaders -- whatever new measures have been taken, it has all been done at the behest of the US to placate an angry India and assist the Afghan government.
Such conspiracy theories do more than confuse the public; they strike at the heart of the consensus this country needs, that the fight against militancy is Pakistan's own and not imposed by the outside world on a hapless nation.
All the confusion can be cleared up by a simple, authoritative statement by the interior ministry, or -- given the implications for national security policy -- by the Prime Minister's Office. But, in a way that echoes the old practice here of saying one thing (or saying nothing) and doing another, the government has chosen to remain silent -- just as the state alternates between remaining silent about drone strikes and condemning them.
Just as once upon a time the army-led security establishment cut clandestine -- sometimes, public -- deals with militant groups while claiming it was opposed to religiously inspired militant groups existing on Pakistani soil. And just as the state banned Lashkar-e-Taiba, but allowed it to first morph into Jamaatud Dawa and now, to some extent, into the Falah-i-Insaniyat Foundation.
A simple path towards clarity -- at least in terms of designation and profiles -- in the present instance was offered by the Supreme Court on Thursday: make public the names of proscribed groups and translate anti-terrorism laws into local languages to increase awareness.
As the Supreme Court observed, often the public is unaware that groups operating as social welfare networks or collecting charity are in fact designated by the state to be terrorist groups. That has the effect of allowing the groups to grow and even gain public affection by pretending to be something they most certainly are not.
Perhaps it will be easier to begin to believe that the era of good militants/bad militants is over if the state can bring itself to name and ban all militant groups.
Posted: 24 Jan 2015 07:12 AM PST
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A senior sharia official in al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Harith al Nadhari, sets forth guidelines for "martyrdom," or suicide, operations in a newly-released video. Al Nadhari's video, which is more than ten minutes long, was released by Al Malahem Media, AQAP's propaganda arm, via one of its official Twitter feeds.
Tweets promoting the video include a hashtag in Arabic that reads, "#The Inviolability_of_Sacrosanct_Blood," meaning Muslim blood. Al Qaeda and other jihadist organizations have attempted to rein in the violence unleashed by their members. Indiscriminate killings of civilians in the Muslim-majority world have, at times, damaged the jihadists' cause by undermining their perceived legitimacy. Indeed, today's jihadists have killed far more Muslims than non-Muslims throughout the history of their operations.
AQAP has also had its operations against Houthis, who are Shiite Muslims, questioned. While AQAP is opposed to the Houthi rebels who have rocked Sanaa's government, the group's operations have generated additional controversy by hitting civilian gatherings.
Nadhari clearly has these issues in mind as he addresses what AQAP, an official branch of al Qaeda, believes are proper restrictions on suicide attacks. Nadhari begins by saying that one of the "worst predicaments" a jihadist can find himself in is the "unjust shedding of inviolable blood." Nadhari cites early Islamic literature and scholars throughout his video to buttress his point.
Nadhari argues that "killing a believer" is more important in the eyes of Allah than the "end of the world." He warns that hellfire awaits those who do not heed his warning.
Because all will stand before Allah on the imagined day of judgment, Nadhari argues, jihadists cannot hide behind the orders of their leaders. Orders issued by one's emir, or leader, should not be "considered a license to shed inviolable blood." Both the emir and the one who follows his instructions will be thrown into hell, Nadhari says.
Nadhari's argument is the same one al Qaeda uses against the Islamic State, which al Qaeda accuses of spilling Muslim blood.
AQAP's ideologue goes on to set forth six recommendations, or guidelines, for conducting "martyrdom" attacks.
First, jihadists should avoid using explosives or other methods "of mass killing" in mosques, markets, stadiums or other areas where Muslims congregate in large numbers.
Second, Nadhari says that jihadists should avoid killing Muslims even if they are being used to shield their enemies. Only in "extreme" circumstances, with guidance from "highly knowledgeable" scholars, should jihadists carry out such operations, Nadhari says.
AQAP's third, fourth and fifth recommendations address the role of jihadist leaders and who is allowed to "issue fatwas concerning martyrdom-seeking operations." Only those individuals who have the proper understanding of sharia law and "Islamic doctrines" should issue such fatwas, Nadhari says. Jihadist leaders must "train and instruct" their fighters on the "correct jurisprudence," such that the "martyrdom-seeker" only moves forward when he is completely certain of the "legitimacy of his target." And leaders must not send suicide operatives to attack "suspicious or controversial targets."
Sixth, and finally, Nadhari says that suicide operatives are at fault if they attack without "wisdom," even if their intentions were good.
AQAP is clearly concerned about how the jihadists' operations are perceived throughout the Muslim-majority world. And Nadhari's guidelines demonstrate, once again, that al Qaeda continues to believe that the jihadists' indiscriminate violence remains a strategic liability for their cause.
A prominent al Qaeda ideologue
Al Qaeda has consistently elevated Harith al Nadhari's media profile, meaning al Qaeda considers him to be a key ideologue for the organization. In addition to having his work promoted by AQAP, Nadhari's writings have been featured in Nawa-e-Afghan Jihad ("Voice of the Afghan Jihad"), a magazine that publishes the works of top al Qaeda leaders and their closest allies. For example, an edition of the magazine published last year included a piece from Nadhari on "ideology and teachings."
Nadhari praised the attack on Charlie Hebdo's offices earlier this month. Another AQAP ideologue subsequently claimed responsibility for the massacre on behalf of the organization.
In addition to the Charlie Hebdo attack, Nadhari regularly comments on events far from Yemen. In August 2013, he discussed the turmoil in Egypt.
In July 2014, Nadhari joined other senior AQAP leaders in defending Ayman al Zawahiri and veteran jihadist ideologues against their critics. Nadhari's message was clearly aimed at supporters of the Islamic State, an al Qaeda offshoot that claims to rule as a "caliphate" over large parts of Iraq and Syria. And in October 2014 he was among the al Qaeda ideologues who attempted to portray the US-led bombing campaign in Iraq and Syria as part of a "Crusade" against the Islamic world.
It is possible that Nadhari also serves as one of Nasir al Wuhayshi's deputy general managers in al Qaeda's global network. Documents recovered in Osama bin Laden's compound show that al Qaeda's general manager has deputies who are appointed to help him carry out his work.
Nasir al Wuhayshi serves as both AQAP's emir and as al Qaeda's general manager, but his deputies have not been publicly identified.
Posted: 24 Jan 2015 11:55 AM PST
The death of Brigadier General Mohammad-Ali Allah-Dadi, the latest Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force (IRGC-QF) officer killed abroad, has generated an outpouring of condolences and support from Iran's political and military elite.
Allah-Dadi, who had a distinguished career and solid Iran-Iraq War background, was killed by an Israeli helicopter assault in the Syrian city of Quneitra, in the Golan Heights. The strike also killed six members of Hezbollah [see LWJ reports, Senior Qods Force general killed in suspected Israeli airstrike, and Hezbollah commanders killed in suspected Israeli airstrike.]
Senior Iranian officials have and are continuing to weigh in on the event, brandishing Iranian deterrence and even threatening retaliation against Israel in their statements. The broad amount of commentary and deep retaliatory sentiment in honor of Allah-Dadi stands in contrast to the somewhat more muted coverage of the recent (Jan. 10, 2015) funeral service of Hossein Ahmadi, another Qods Force officer "martyred" in Syria. Clearly, the killing of Allah-Dadi struck a chord.
The Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Admiral Ali Shamkhani, claimed that "the current of resistance would answer the terrorist action of the Zionist regime with revolutionary intensity and determination in a time and place of our choosing." Such open-ended threats were not limited to Shamkhani. In a prepared statement, Major General Mohammad-Ali Aziz-Jafari, the Commander of Iran's IRGC proclaimed that "These martyrdoms have proved that we must not distance ourselves from Jihad; the Zionists must await our destructive thunderbolts, in the past they have seen the emergence of our anger."
Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, the Deputy Qods Force Commander echoed Shamkhani's sentiments, adding a twist of his own against Israel: "We will certainly provide the answer to your brashness and thuggery in our own time and place, and know that we will be [the] file against your spirit and life."
Even former President Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the current Chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council, used similar language, as he proclaimed, "To quote the Secretary-General of Lebanon's Hezbollah, the Zionists [should] go prepare their refuge."
Framing the strike as part of an attempt to blunt Iran's regional preeminence was Brigadier General Hossein Salami, the IRGC Deputy Commander who stated, "The Zionists engaged in such a crime due to the defeats they have suffered from Hezbollah in Yemen, Bahrain, Iraq, and Syria." Salami too issued a warning: "The Zionists should know that they will see the ruinous thunderbolts of the IRGC in action, as in the past."
Praising Allah-Dadi more specifically, and linking his legacy to Iran's Islamic Revolution was Major General Mostafa Izadi, a Deputy in Iran's General Staff Armed Forces, who eulogized that "The martyr [Shahid] Allah-Dadi was the type of person who really knew himself, and found this luck to be present in different stages of the Revolution."
An inspection of Allah-Dadi's recent arrival in the Syrian theater points to his having been tapped for the role by Qods Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani. Such affinity between Soleimani and Allah-Dadi helps to indicate why Soleimani took time out of his day as Qods Force Commander to personally perform the Ziarat-e Ashura prayer during Allah-Dadi's funeral service.
Additionally weighing-in was Hojjat al-Eslam Mohammad-Hassan Abutorabi Fard, the Deputy-Speaker of Iran's Parliament. Implying that Hezbollah would be in charge of the response, he noted: "Until present, the Zionists have received several slaps from the Islamic Resistance and Hezbollah, and the response of Hezbollah to this Zionist crime will be exceptional and special."
Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani on the other hand, chose to praise Allah-Dadi's "martyrdom" without linking it to a threat against Israel. The same went for Yazd Governor Seyyed Mohammad Mir Mohammadi, in charge of the city housing the Al-Ghadir IRGC unit which Allah-Dadi formerly commanded. Mir Mohammadi stated: "Martyrdom is the art of men of God."
Iranian cabinet ministers too, have offered their condolences. Foreign Minister Mohammad-Javad Zarif called the attack an "insane act," while Intelligence Minister Hojjat al-Eslam Alavi stated that Allah-Dadi was killed while engaged in "an advisory function to help the innocent government and nation of Syria against Takfiri-Salafi terrorists."
And of course, the set of condolences included those of Hossein Dehqan, Iran's Minister of Defense. Dehqan's history of support to Hezbollah is well-known, as evidenced by his recent reference to Israeli activity in Quneitra circa 1982. Dehqan stated that "This terrorist action of the Zionist regime in the Golan [Heights] is the continuation of the crimes of the regime in Palestine, Syria, Iraq, [and] Lebanon."
Recently, pictures have emerged from the ceremonies and funeral service of Mohammad-Ali Allah-Dadi. One notable photo is of current and former IRGC Commanders (skipping over Yahya-Rahim Safavi) Rezaie and Jafari. At the service, Major General Jafari took his praise of Allahdadi in a different direction than his earlier prepared commentary. While it is expected for the Islamic Republic's elite to praise their deceased colleague and continue their vitriol against Israel, Jafari morphed Allah-Dadi's death abroad into part of the foreign policy legacy of the Islamic Republic: "The Islamic Revolution outside the country's borders is advancing with speed and is after the conquest of fortifications, and is the realization of the ideals of the deceased Imam (Ayatollah Khomeini) and the martyrs."
Recent developments in the Middle East only underscore this point for Iranian elites, and perhaps more so for the scores abroad, like Allah-Dadi, who serve[d] under them.
Posted: 23 Jan 2015 07:14 PM PST
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Earlier today, published reports cited family members of Mohamed al Zahawi, the leader of Ansar al Sharia in Benghazi, as saying that Zahawi had succumbed to injuries sustained during fighting last year. Zahawi's death had been rumored for months, but there was never any confirmation. His family told the press that he had been hospitalized since receiving his wounds. A Libyan military official said that Zahawi had been seriously wounded during fighting in September 2014. You can read our coverage here.
More evidence of Zahawi's demise has surfaced online. Jihadists have posted a photo, shown above, that allegedly shows Zahawi after his death.
Posted: 23 Jan 2015 07:12 PM PST
Cameroonian armed forces rescued approximately 24 hostages on January 19 just one day after Boko Haram terrorists raided Mabass village, located in northern Cameroon, and abducted nearly 80 villagers. Local military sources estimated that 50 children were among those abducted and scores of homes were also destroyed in the attack.
More details on the incident were reported by Reuters:
"According to our initial information, around 30 adults, most of them herders, and 50 young girls and boys aged between 10 and 15 years were abducted," a senior army officer deployed to northern Cameroon told Reuters.
He said the early-morning attack had targeted the village of Mabass and other villages along the porous border. Soldiers intervened and exchanged fire with the raiders for around two hours, he added.
Government spokesman Issa Tchiroma confirmed the attack, in which he said three people had been killed, as well as the kidnappings. He was not able to say with certainty how many people had been taken in the raid.
"There was a Boko Haram attack on several localities in the Far North region. The assailants burnt down about 80 homes and kidnapped several inhabitants including women and very young children," he said.
The attack on Sunday reportedly included hundreds of Boko Haram militants who went house to house taking women and children before attempting to flee back over the border into Nigeria.
Deutsche Welle provided some sobering claims about the challenges in securing the porous border areas between Cameroon and Nigeria:
Half of the 500 kilometer (311 miles) border that Cameroon shares with Nigeria is already occupied by Boko Haram on the Nigerian side, and DW's correspondent said it would be easy for them to cross over and kidnap more Cameroonians or send in suicide bombers.
The release of some of the hostages while Cameroon's forces were in pursuit came after Chad had begun deploying troops to the country to assist in the fight against the extremists.
Thousands of Chadian troops have arrived in Cameroon in some 400 military trucks, accompanied by military helicopters.<
The weekend clash and mass abduction by Boko Haram is setting the stage for the much touted intervention by neighboring Chad. Last week, the Chadian Parliament voted 150 to 0 to provide military assistance to both Cameroon and Nigeria to help battle Boko Haram. Chadian Government officials have since disclosed that the deployment of its forces to Cameroon includes around 2,000 soldiers, armored vehicles and attack helicopters, according to Al Jazeera America.

Posted by solsticewitch13 at 6:21 PM

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