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Who's
to Blame in Iraq? Part II: The Sunni Side
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Originally published under the title, "Iraqi impasses
(2): Sunni side up."
The previous
post discussed problems on the Shi'a side that hinder a more general
Sunni-Shi'a 'reconciliation' in Iraq. Specifically, there is a general
reluctance on the Shi'a political spectrum to address basic Sunni
grievances on issues such as de-Ba'athification, and the phenomenon of
Shi'a militiafication of the security forces has only further sidelined
meaningful discussion of reforms to outreach to Sunnis.
However, it does not follow that Iraq's impasse is solely the fault of
the country's Shi'a. Any analysis must also address the issue of Sunni
rejectionism: that is, an absolute unwillingness to accept the
post-Saddam order, with aspirations for 'revolution' (thawra) in
the overthrow of the central government. Such rejectionism is embodied in
the fact that none of the main Sunni insurgent brands accepts the notion
of working within the system. Rather, believing Sunni Arabs to be at
least a plurality if not a majority of Iraq's population (an erroneous
belief), they all currently aim for 'revolution' with fantastical notions
of the conquest of
Baghdad.
None of the main Sunni insurgent
brands accepts the notion of working within the system.
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Indeed, rejectionism has even more currency than during the height of
the U.S. occupation as a perceived failure of the political process for
Sunnis has given credence to the narrative of groups that have rejected
the idea of working within the system all along, such as the
Ba'athist-Sufi Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia (JRTN), widely
considered the second most powerful insurgent group after the Islamic
State (IS).
Yet, this rejectionism has also helped facilitate the rise of IS,
which initially worked with other Sunni insurgent groups in bringing
about the downfall of the major cities of Fallujah, Mosul and Tikrit but
has since come to dominate these places at the expense of the likes of
JRTN. In one case, that of rival jihadi group Jamaat
Ansar al-Islam, the group has been absorbed into IS through pledges
of allegiance while the remainder has disbanded and quit the field.
Despite such developments, the prevalence of rejectionism means that
the wider insurgency generally remains in denial that the IS phenomenon
constitutes a problem, such that there even tends to be avoidance of
mentioning IS by name, with no honest condemnation of the worst of IS'
excesses including the targeting of minorities like the Yezidis and
Christians as well as destruction of shrines and heritage sites. The JRTN
goes so far as to blame
the government for these actions. Such denial and lack of attachment
to reality can only amount to complicity in IS' crimes.
With belief in the inevitability of 'revolution' and fighting IS not
viewed as a priority, the Sunni insurgent groups with their rejectionism
and support bases prove a huge obstacle to forming a coherent local Sunni
force within Iraq to push back IS. Indeed, they all denounce current
premier Hayder Abadi's National Guard plans and similar hopes to
incorporate more Sunnis into the security forces as nefarious schemes
aimed at destroying
the 'revolution' and/or provoking
an internal Sunni civil war to facilitate Iranian domination.
Meanwhile, the coalition airstrikes targeting IS are presented as being
part of a wider international war
against Sunnis and Islam.
Not all Sunni groups have avoided speaking frankly about problems with
IS, but the results of localized open clashes have never gone in their
favour, pointing to the weakness of a lack of a united Sunni front
against IS. A case-in-point is the Salafi group Jaysh al-Mujahideen,
which openly
condemned IS in a lengthy tract issued in January 2014. The group clashed
with IS in the locality of al-Karma in Anbar province in August 2014,
but was forced to withdraw from the main town. Despite this major loss,
nothing points to Jaysh al-Mujahideen members and/or leaders being open
to the idea of working with the government against IS.
In sum, Iraq's current round of major instability may not be as bloody
as the dark days of the 2006 civil war, but with so many obstacles on
both sides hindering a major accord between Sunni and Shi'a in Iraq, this
phase of conflict is set to be a protracted war over many years to come
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a
Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum.
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