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Why
Has the U.S. Congress Done So Little About UNRWA?
by Steven J. Rosen
Justice
Winter 2014-2015
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American defenders of Israel generally see the United Nations Relief
and Works Agency (UNRWA) as one of the worst UN agencies, an organization
that harbors terrorists, teaches militant conflict with Israel and
anti-Semitism in its schools, and perpetuates the Palestinian refugee
issue as a source of tension.[1]
Yet the paradox is that the United States has consistently been the
largest single-state donor to UNRWA.
Therefore it is not surprising that UNRWA's critics have turned
repeatedly to Congress, where they know there is bipartisan support for
Israel, to fight UNRWA's practices. About once every year, a pro-Israel
organization announces an anti-UNRWA initiative on Capitol Hill. With
equal frequency, members of Congress issue press statements proposing
legislation and sense-of-Congress resolutions targeting UNRWA's ties to
terrorism, anti-Semitism in its textbooks, and UNRWA policies that
perpetuate rather than resolve the refugee issue. Seemingly, UNRWA is an
important item on the foreign policy agenda of the United States
Congress.
In its most important actions,
Congress has been a steady and reliable supporter of UNRWA.
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From all of this, the casual observer might imagine Congress to be a
bulwark against UNRWA. But in reality, this is a mistaken impression. In
its most important actions, Congress has in fact been a steady and
reliable supporter of UNRWA, from the beginning of American aid to UNRWA
in 1950, up to the present. As Karen Abu Zayd, former (2005-2009)
Commissioner-General of UNRWA, said in April 2012:
even those who scrutinise [UNRWA] most closely and challenge it most
severely are those who also ensure that its programmes receive adequate
funding... [D]espite persistent threats to decrease or eliminate funding,
from some members of the US Congress acting according to what they
believe is the interest of Israel,... there is little actual threat to
its survival as an agency.[2]
In each of UNRWA's 64 years, Congress has appropriated aid to UNRWA in
steadily rising amounts. The cumulative total of American assistance to
UNRWA has now reached $5 billion.[3]
Nor has Congress used America's status as the leading donor to impose
reforms of UNRWA's deplorable practices. While the House and Senate have
passed numerous statutory limitations and conditions on aid to the Palestinian
Authority,[4]
in all these years only a single obligatory limitation has been placed on
appropriations to UNRWA—Section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act,
conditioning aid on UNRWA's non-involvement with terrorists.
This is not because individual members have failed to propose other
legislative initiatives and sense-of-Congress resolutions. Recent
proposals included the UNRWA Integrity Act (2006), the UNRWA Humanitarian
Accountability Act (2010), the United Nations Transparency,
Accountability, and Reform Act (2011), the Palestine Accountability Act
(2013), the Palestinian and United Nations Anti-Terrorism Act (2014), and
other proposals. (See Appendix of Congressional Resolutions on UNRWA.)
But the little-known truth is that with the sole exception of Section
301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act, not a single one of these UNRWA
reform initiatives has had majority support in the house of Congress in
which it was introduced, and only Section 301(c) was passed by both
houses of Congress and signed by the President. In fact, only one of the
other proposals had as many as 142 House sponsors out of the 435 members
in the House of Representatives. Most of the proposals had 30 or fewer
supporters. None in the Senate had as many as twelve sponsors. And, most
importantly, every single proposed UNRWA reform bill or sense-of-Congress
resolution in either house of Congress, except Section 301(c), died after
a few months and was not enacted (details in the Appendix).
How could this be? How is it possible that UNRWA, an agency so odious
to Israel's friends, enjoys such immunity in the United States Congress?
Why did all these efforts to do something about UNRWA die in Congress
without enactment? There are several reasons.
AIPAC's
Silence
The first and most immediate problem, well known to the lead sponsors
of the proposed legislation but hidden from the wider public, is that
none of the failed initiatives had real support from the American Israel
Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the central political arm of the pro-
Israel lobby. Except in the solitary case of Section 301(c), AIPAC did
not activate its staff and lay activist system to build support for any
of these resolutions among Democrats and Republicans in the House and
Senate.
None of the failed UNRWA reform
initiatives had real support from AIPAC.
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In fact, AIPAC keeps its distance from anti-UNRWA initiatives, never
opposing them, lest their Congressional and organizational sponsors—and
some AIPAC donors— take offence, but not gathering co-sponsors either.
AIPAC would certainly never come out and say, "Hands off
UNRWA." It would never acknowledge, even privately, that this is its
implicit policy, but it is.
The reason is certainly not that AIPAC has any great love for UNRWA,
or is ignorant of the destructive role that UNRWA plays. I served as a
senior policy official of AIPAC for two and a half decades, and I can
testify that its lay and professional leadership are as frustrated as
anyone in the wider pro-Israel community that so little is being done
about the UNRWA cancer. But AIPAC knows from bitter experience that if it
yields to the temptation to join an initiative against UNRWA, it will be
in an untenable position, out on a limb that will be sawed off by the
Government of Israel.
Israel's
Strange Bedfellow
This seemingly adversarial relationship between UNRWA and Israel
obscures a deeper reality well known to those most directly involved on
the ground. Deeply flawed as the agency is, Israel depends on UNRWA as an
element promoting stability in the West Bank and Gaza, a vital strategic
objective for the Jewish State.
Israel depends on UNRWA as an
element promoting stability in the West Bank and Gaza.
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UNRWA's role has been critical since Israel first gained control of
the territories almost five decades ago in the June1967, Six Day War. On
June 12, 1967, shortly after the fighting stopped, Israel's U.N.
Ambassador, Michael Comay, and UNRWA's Commissioner-General, Lawrence
Michelmore, signed a formal agreement establishing recognition by the
State of Israel of UNRWA's activity in the West Bank and Gaza. The
Israeli government committed itself to "nonintervention" in the
U.N. agency's affairs in the humanitarian sphere, reserving the right to
intervene only where there are threats to national security. Israel agreed
to facilitate the work of the Agency rather than impede it.[5]
On many occasions since that time, the Government of Israel has
reaffirmed its commitment to the Comay-Michelmore agreement and to
cooperation with UNRWA. For example, in November 2009, at a major event
marking the 60th anniversary of UNRWA, the Israeli representative
underscored Israel's continued
commitment to the understandings expressed in the 1967 Comay-Michelmore
... Letters. Israel would continue to do its utmost to facilitate UNRWA's
operations, subject to the upholding of its own security. Israel was
especially devoted to maintaining the close coordination that existed
between the Agency and Israeli officials in the field.[6]
On the same occasion, UNRWA Commissioner-General Karen Abu Zayd
affirmed the excellent degree of cooperation that UNRWA enjoyed with the
Israeli authorities.[7]
The epicenter of Israel's cooperation with UNRWA is Israel's Ministry
of Defense and the IDF, and specifically the office of the Coordinator of
Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), which has the
day-to-day task of coordinating civil and security affairs in the West
Bank and Gaza. COGAT attempts to maintain a good working relationship
with UNRWA, mainly to help the agency perform its task of providing vital
services to the Palestinian Arabs, services that the IDF might have to
provide if UNRWA were suddenly removed. As UNRWA Commissioner-General Abu
Zayd observed,
Eliminating UNRWA would serve only to
deprive Palestine refugees of the basic public services... offered by the
Agency. Such services would then have to be provided by another body; in
the case of West Bank and Gaza that would be the occupying power, Israel.
This explains the official Israeli government support for the role of
UNRWA, and the reason there is a modicum of cooperation in allowing basic
provision of goods and services by UNRWA in the occupied Palestinian
territory.[8]
Israel's "surprisingly good relations with UNRWA" were
explained by a former deputy head of COGAT, retired Brigadier General
Baruch Spiegel:
The Israeli government supports [UNRWA]
educational programs because it is strongly averse to the other alternative:
Palestinian children attending Hamas schools in both Gaza and the West
Bank. Jerusalem believes that, for all of Hamas' penetration of the UNRWA
school system, children educated in UNRWA's schools are indoctrinated to
a lesser extent with anti-Israel and anti- Semitic hatred than those
attending Hamas' own schools, which appear to be little more than hotbeds
for terrorism and violence... Forced to choose between allowing Hamas to
carry out [post-conflict] reconstruction or work with UNRWA, Israeli officials
prefer to partner with UNRWA, hoping this would prevent the Islamist
terror group from obtaining dual-use construction materials.... Jerusalem
seems perfectly content to... leave negotiations over the final
settlement of the refugee problem until such time as a lasting peace
settlement is reached.[9]
The Congressional Research Service reports that "Israeli
officials ... assert that UNRWA plays a valuable role by providing
stability and serving as the eyes and ears of the international community
in Gaza. They generally characterize UNRWA's continued presence as
preferable to the uncertain alternative that might emerge if UNRWA were
removed from the picture."[10]
(The State Department expressed a similar view in its 2015 budget
submission to Congress: "UNRWA plays a stabilizing role in the
Middle East through its assistance programs, serving as an important
counterweight to extremist elements."[11])
Israel's dependence on UNRWA makes it leery of anti-UNRWA activity by
its friends in Western countries. In January 2010, the president of
Canada's Treasury Board announced that the Harper government would
redirect its Palestinian aid away from UNRWA and toward specific projects
of the Palestinian Authority, much to the satisfaction of pro-Israel
organizations in the country.[12]
But six months later, in August 2010, the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA) reported that, "In discussions with ...
Israel ..., Canada has been asked to resume funding the [UNRWA] General
Fund." A critic of the pro-Israel groups sneered, "The lobby is
working in a vacuum with very poor information, pushing for actions that
the Israeli government feels is not in its interest."[13]
In
2012, Dutch Foreign Minister Uri Rosenthal was reportedly told by the
Israelis to leave UNRWA funding alone.
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A similar case occurred in the Netherlands in December 2011, when
Foreign Minister Uri Rosenthal said that Holland would "thoroughly
review" its policy toward UNRWA because its definition of a refugee
is "worrisome" and creates a "big obstacle to peace."[14] Three months later, a member
of the Dutch parliament, who was working to condition or cut funding to
UNRWA, reported that the Foreign Minister told him that
"Jerusalem" asked him to leave the UNRWA funding alone.[15]
I can confirm that, during my long service at AIPAC, this was also our
experience. Independent pro-Israel voices would initiate an action on
Capitol Hill to cut or condition UNRWA aid; then the State Department
would call Jerusalem to demand that Israel call off the dogs (what is
known in the trade as "The Call"); and soon we at AIPAC would
get a call from the Israeli Embassy in Washington to urge restraint.
After a few such experiences, it is not surprising that my colleagues in
the Legislative Department became unreceptive when well-intentioned
people called the organization to propose new plans to reform UNRWA.
Other Reasons
why UNRWA Is Immune
Israel's strange partnership with UNRWA is probably the most important
reason Congress has "spared the rod," but it is not the only
reason.
Inflaming the Region: Most Democrats, and some Republicans, are
reluctant to take on UNRWA, because they fear it would inflame the
already explosive situation in the Middle East. They see that the
"Right of Return," symbolized by UNRWA's very existence, is a
sacred issue to Palestinians. Even the comparatively moderate President
of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, said: "The Palestinian
refugees' right to return to the 1948 borders is a personal right, like
marriage... No country, authority, organization, or even Abu Mazen... can
deny anyone his right to return."[16] Some members fear stoking
anger in the Arab "street" and provoking anti-American rage, if
they touch the "third rail" issue of the refugees.
Final Status Issue: Members of Congress who believe that an
Israeli-Palestinian final status agreement is attainable hope that
UNRWA's imperfections will no longer matter when the refugee issue that
keeps the organization alive is resolved in a conflict-ending agreement.
These members seek "evenhandedness," which they think the
President and the Secretary of State will require in order to have
credibility as mediators to bring such an agreement to fruition.
Sympathy for the Underdog: There is also a pervasive sentiment
that the Palestinians, especially the ones that UNRWA considers to be
"refugees," are the people who landed at the bottom in the
Middle East, so they deserve sympathy as the "underdog." If
UNRWA's clients sometimes behave badly, they should be given a discount,
because they are the victims. Sure, UNRWA is not perfect, but members do
not want to seem ungenerous toward those less fortunate, or indifferent
to their plight.
Hidden in the Weeds: Another barrier to taking on UNRWA is the
fact that its annual appropriation is buried in the massive State
Department account, which includes literally thousands of items, of which
UNRWA is only a tiny part. The overworked members of the various relevant
congressional State and Foreign Operations, Middle East, and
International Organization committees that oversee UNRWA authorizations
and appropriations cannot possibly get involved in all the controversies
hidden in these encyclopedic State Department presentations.
UNRWA is part of the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account,
managed by the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration (PRM). PRM's annual written Congressional Presentations on
MRA—one of many State submissions to Congress each year—typically run
about 40 pages, covering hundreds of programs.[17] And in these omnibus
documents, the scant references to UNRWA are usually confined to a few
barely noticeable paragraphs. When UNRWA is mentioned, the references depict
admirable, compassionate public servants delivering vital social services
to the poor, the homeless, and the desperate. Many members do not want to
waste time taking issue with this, when there are so many more
controversies that must be debated just to get through the MRA account.
Rescue in Syria: Since 2011, UNRWA's rescue work in Syria has
become another reason that it is exempted from serious scrutiny on
Capitol Hill. There is wide bipartisan sympathy for UNRWA's undeniably
vital work trying to protect the 270,000 desperate Syrian-Palestinians
who have been displaced by the Assad regime's brutal aggression against
civilians.[18]
In the face of this tragedy, there are probably more members who want to
increase financial support to UNRWA, than there are to curtail it.
UNRWA Lobby in Washington: In 2011, UNRWA opened a lobbying arm
in Washington. The Washington Representation office is tasked to
"regularly and actively engage with relevant members of Congress and
Congressional staffers to advance understanding of UNRWA" and to
conduct advocacy with the State Department and the National Security
Council.[19]
UNRWA
Washington representative Matthew A. Reynolds
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Armed with a substantial budget provided in part by U.S. taxpayers,
UNRWA recruited highly experienced Washington insiders to represent its
interests. Director Matthew A. Reynolds previously served as Assistant
Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, Staff Director of the
powerful House Rules Committee, and staff member on the House International
Relations and Senate Foreign Relations Committees. Deputy Director Chris
McGrath previously worked for Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and
Senator Robert Menendez, now chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.
Led by this well-chosen team, the UNRWA office works quietly but
effectively behind the scenes, depicting the organization as benign and
building its defenses against assaults on the Hill. The official
representatives are assisted by a privately-funded U.S. citizen lobby for
UNRWA, also in Washington, the American Friends of UNRWA, led by Phil
Wilcox, formerly a senior State Department official. It has an annual
budget of $500,000, raised through tax-exempt contributions.[20]
Israel Is the
Key
If Israel were to change its policy toward UNRWA, would that be
sufficient in itself to produce different results in Congress, or would
these other causal factors have to change too?
This hypothetical question cannot be answered with certitude, because
up to now it has not happened. But most observers who have watched the
history of pro-Israel advocacy on Capitol Hill have been impressed by the
ability of AIPAC to achieve ambitious legislative objectives, even
against great resistance, when it commits its full resources, with the
backing of Israel, to achieve bipartisan support. For example, AIPAC's
many successes in conditioning aid to the Palestinian Authority, and in
imposing economic sanctions on Iran, were achieved by overpowering
numerous opponents, no less formidable than those protecting UNRWA.
But AIPAC will not support an UNRWA initiative that does not have
clear backing from Israel. It follows that Israel is the key.
The Cause of
the Problem
UNRWA's policies are not subject to direct control by Congress or the
U.S. government. UNRWA is an Agency of the United Nations, operating
under authority and funding granted by the United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA) and oversight by UNGA's Fourth Committee. In reality,
UNRWA enjoys nearly automatic rubber-stamp support in the UNGA, and
Israel receives nothing but hostility there. So any effort to change
UNRWA's policies in favor of Israel through the UNGA would be futile.
Congressional shaming of UNRWA has
not been enough to remedy its deep-seated problems.
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The U.S. Congress can try to influence UNRWA through "soft
power," by holding hearings, issuing sense-of-Congress resolutions,
and making individual statements— shining a light on UNRWA's shortcomings
to embarrass the agency and call attention to its faults. On occasion,
this process of shaming UNRWA has had some effect, but overall soft power
has not been enough to remedy its deep-seated problems. The more
effective lever that Congress could use to influence UNRWA, its
"hard power," is the threat to reduce or suspend United States
financial assistance if Congressional conditions are not met.
Conditioning aid does work, albeit imperfectly, in the one piece of UNRWA
reform legislation that was enacted into law, Section 301(c) of the
Foreign Assistance Act, prohibiting aid if the agency supports terror in
any way.
But, with the exception of Section 301(c), this most effective form of
pressure—conditioning aid—is exactly what Israel quietly opposes. That is
the main reason that most of the UNRWA reform initiatives described in
the Appendix did not have the support they needed and therefore died
without enactment.
A Way Out of
the Impasse?
Are there additional steps that Congress could take to address the
UNRWA problem without crossing the Israeli red line? One avenue that has
not been tried is Congressional action to correct State Department policy
toward UNRWA, rather than UNRWA itself.
For 64 years, the State Department ("State") has colluded in
UNRWA practices that perpetuate the refugee problem rather than resolving
it. Instead of seeking to correct the dubious UNRWA designations that
continually expand the refugee population instead of resolving the
problem or reducing its scale, State defends UNRWA practices. State
routinely repeats as truth the fiction that there are more than five
million "refugees."[21]
State defends the practice of counting as Palestinian
"refugees" people who became citizens of other Arab states;
defends counting people who were never refugees, but are merely
grandchildren of deceased refugees; and defends counting people already
living in the West Bank and Gaza, territory that the Palestinians
themselves have declared to be their "homeland" and
"state" and the location where declared U.S. policy states that
they should be settled.
These UNRWA practices foment conflict and hurt peace. And yet the
State Department declares and defends what it openly calls "United
States acceptance [of] UNRWA's method of recognizing refugees."[22]
UNRWA practices are in conflict
with the black letter laws of the United States.
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These UNRWA practices are also in conflict with the black letter laws
of the United States. For example, more than 90% of the two million UNRWA
"refugees" who reside in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan are
citizens of that country under Articles 3 and 9 of Jordan's Nationality
Law No. 6 of 1954.[23]
Under United States law, a person who is living as a legal citizen in
another country and is not subject to extreme persecution in that country
cannot be considered to be a "refugee." To be eligible for U.S.
refugee status, an individual must be either a "person who is
outside any country of such person's nationality or ... is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution."[24] These conditions do not exist
among Palestinians who are citizens of Jordan, yet State joins UNRWA in
calling these millions of Jordanian citizens with well-established lives
in Jordan "refugees."
Another example of UNRWA definitions contravening U.S. law is the
UNRWA practice of automatically conferring derivative "refugee"
status on persons who never lived in what is now Israel and who were
never displaced, but who are merely descended from a (male) refugee, even
if they are merely grandchildren or great-grandchildren who have long
been settled elsewhere. Section 207 of the United States Immigration and
Nationality Act allows spouses and minor children of refugees to apply
for derivative status as refugees but, unlike UNRWA's policies, does not
allow for grandchildren or great-grandchildren. Indeed, the federal
regulation implementing Section 207 specifically declares that
grandchildren are ineligible for derivative refugee status.[25] Form I-730, the USCIS Refugee/Asylee
Relative Petition used by the Department of Homeland Security, says that
"A petition may not be approved for the following persons: ...(6) A
parent, sister, brother, grandparent, grandchild, nephew, niece, uncle,
aunt, cousin, or in-law."[26]
If these legal standards were followed by the State Department in
reviewing the UNRWA registration system, the United States would no
longer recognize more than 90% of UNRWA beneficiaries as refugees.
Yet, in recent statements, State specifically endorses the practice of
giving derivative "refugee" status to grandchildren of
authentic (male) Palestinian refugees. "UNRWA generally recognizes
descendants of refugees as refugees," State Department spokesman Patrick
Ventrell told The Cable. "For purposes of their operations,
the U.S. government supports this guiding principle."[27] In correspondence with the
Congressional Research Service in September 2013, the State Department
defended this practice at length.[28]
Another example is State's willingness to call Palestinians who
already reside in the territory of their own declared "state"
in the West Bank and Gaza "refugees." Forty percent of
Palestinians listed by UNRWA as "refugees" reside in the West
Bank and Gaza. This population could not qualify as refugees under the applicable
laws in the United States, because they are "firmly resettled"
within the guidelines of the Immigration and Nationality Act.[29] According to that Act, persons
who are "firmly resettled" in another country are barred from
receiving refugee status in the U.S., whether or not they have been given
formal citizenship where they reside.
The Palestinian Basic Law provides unambiguously that the residents of
the West Bank and Gaza are permanently settled: "No Palestinian may
be deported from the homeland, prevented or prohibited from returning to
or leaving it, deprived of his citizenship, or handed over to any foreign
entity."[30]
The U.S. Department of State has determined that the Palestinian
Authority Passport/Travel Document meets the requirements of a passport
as defined in Section 101(a)(30) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) and therefore is acceptable for visa issuing purposes and entering
and departing the United States.[31]
It is also clearly established United States policy that Palestinians
who live in the West Bank and Gaza are citizens of the Palestinian
Authority already residing in what will be their future state, not
refugees preparing to resettle in Israel or another country. Three
Presidents — Barack Obama,[32]
William Clinton,[33]
and George W. Bush[34]—
have declared that the durable solution to the Palestinian refugee
problem will be their settlement in the future state of Palestine (i.e.,
the West Bank and Gaza), not Israel. The United States House of
Representatives and the Senate have already endorsed the principle that
the Palestinian refugees should be settled in the future Palestinian
state, not Israel, and so stated in a Concurrent Resolution passed in
both houses in June 2004.[35]
Congress should insist that the State Department be consistent with these
laws and policies. The millions of Palestinians who already live in the
West Bank and Gaza are not "refugees."
A Strategy to
Move Forward
If Congress cannot "fix" UNRWA, because Israel's dependence
on that organization stands in the way, it can "fix" the State
Department's policy toward the definition of a Palestinian
"refugee." The United States needs to lead the donor nations in
redefining UNRWA as a social service agency delivering health care and
educational opportunities to needy Palestinians, not an agency for
persons falsely defined as refugees.[36]
If Congress cannot "fix"
UNRWA, it can "fix" the State Department's policy toward the
definition of a Palestinian "refugee."
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The purpose should not be to terminate UNRWA services for registrants
who are not really refugees, but to reregister them in other non-refugee
categories that already exist in UNRWA's own rules. UNRWA's Consolidated
Eligibility & Registration Instructions do not require UNRWA
beneficiaries to be classified as "refugees" because its Section
III.A.2 and Section III.B create classes of UNRWA beneficiaries not
registered as "refugees" but who are nonetheless eligible for
UNRWA services. These classes of persons are listed as "Other
Registered Persons" and persons "eligible to receive UNRWA
services without being registered in UNRWA's Registration System."[37]
Changing U.S. practices could lead, over time, to corresponding
changes in other donor countries in the European Union, Japan, Australia,
and Canada. If all the major donors redefined this population as
"needy persons, yes, but refugees, no," it would be a major
contribution toward reducing conflict in the region. It would not solve
all the problems of UNRWA, but it would ameliorate UNRWA's most damaging
effect, its practices that perpetuate the refugee issue as a source of
tension and conflict.
This is something Congress can do without harming UNRWA's ability to
deliver social services. An untested question is whether, if Israel
nonetheless received that "Call" from Washington to "call
off the dogs," it would feel obligated to oppose the legislation
even though UNRWA's budget would not be cut and its schools and hospitals
would continue to function.
Steven J. Rosen is Director of
the Washington Project of the Middle East Forum. From 1982 to 2005, he
was a senior official of the pro-Israel lobby AIPAC, the American Israel
Public Affairs Committee.
Appendix:
Congressional Resolutions on UNRWA
1999: Section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act conditioned
United States aid on UNRWA taking "all possible measures to assure
that" no U.S. assistance goes to any UNRWA beneficiary who "is
receiving military training" for any guerrilla organization or
"who has engaged in any act of terrorism." In 2003, PL 108-7,
Section 580, required the General Accounting Office (GAO) to report to
the appropriations committees on State Department compliance with Section
301(c) of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act and the implementation of
procedures established to meet State standards for Section 301(c).[38]
Result: Enacted into law, (Title 22 U.S. Code sec. 2221).
2003: House Concurrent Resolution 311 urging UNRWA to establish
a program for resettling refugees and urging the international community
to recognize the plight of Jewish refugees from Arab countries. 22
cosponsors.[39]
Result: Died in Committee.
2006: House Resolution 5278: UNRWA Integrity Act. 20 cosponsors.
To condition aid to UNRWA on Presidential certification that UNRWA
"is not an impediment to achieving a lasting solution for
Palestinian refugees in the West Bank and Gaza and moving such refugees
to post-refugee status" and mandates a report by the Secretary of
State on the extent to which UNRWA "contributes to a solution to the
refugee problem or perpetuates the refugee problem"; that
"UNRWA programs encourage or discourage Palestinians from moving out
of refugee camps and pursuing an economically independent
existence"; that UNRWA has "a long-term plan for providing jobs
and housing for Palestinian refugees and for phasing out services
provided by UNRWA; and the extent to which UNRWA includes in its
educational materials or other programs anti-Semitic elements or elements
that promote the denial of the right of Israel to exist."[40]
Result: Died in Committee.
2009: House Concurrent Resolution 29. 32 sponsors.
Sense-of-Congress resolution that reaffirms Section 301(c) of the Foreign
Assistance Act conditioning UNRWA aid on no involvement with terror;
calls on UNRWA to improve their transparency by publishing online copies
of all educational materials used in UNRWA-administered schools; and
urges UNRWA to improve their accountability by implementing terrorist
name recognition software and other screening procedures that would help
to ensure that UNRWA staff, volunteers, and beneficiaries are neither
terrorists themselves, nor affiliated with known terrorist organizations.[41]
Result: Died in committee.
2010: House Resolution 5065. The UNRWA Humanitarian Accountability
Act. 5 sponsors.[42]
Conditions aid to UNRWA on a determination by the Secretary of State that
no person affiliated with UNRWA is "a member of a Foreign Terrorist
Organization; has ... disseminated... anti-American, anti-Israel, or
anti-Semitic ... propaganda; or has used any UNRWA resources... to
propagate or disseminate political materials...; no UNRWA ... facility...
is being used by a Foreign Terrorist Organization ..."; UNRWA is
subject to comprehensive financial audits by an internationally
recognized third party independent auditing firm and has implemented an
effective system... to prevent the use... of any UNRWA resources by any
foreign terrorist organization.... Also includes a Sense-of- Congress
resolution that the President and the Secretary of State should lead a
high-level diplomatic effort to encourage other responsible nations to
withhold contributions to UNRWA, ... until UNRWA has met the conditions
listed in ... this Act; citizens of recognized states should be removed
from UNRWA's jurisdiction; UNRWA's definition of a Palestine refugee
should be changed to that used for a refugee by the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; and... responsibility for those
refugees should be fully transferred to the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees.
Result: Died in Committee.
2011: House Resolution 2829. The United Nations Transparency,
Accountability, and Reform Act of 2011, Section XIII. 142 sponsors.
Related Bills: S.1848 12/8/2011: 4 Sponsors.[43] Reintroduced in September 2013
as United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act of 2013
H.R. 3155 and S. 1313.[44]
Section XIII regarding UNWRA adopts the exact same language as the UNRWA
Humanitarian Accountability Act of 2010, which was not enacted.
Conditions aid to UNRWA on a determination by the Secretary of State that
no person affiliated with UNRWA is "a member of a Foreign Terrorist
Organization; has ... disseminated... anti-American, anti-Israel, or
anti-Semitic ... propaganda; or has used any UNRWA resources... to
propagate or disseminate political materials...; no UNRWA... facility...
is being used by a Foreign Terrorist Organization ..."; UNRWA is
subject to comprehensive financial audits by an internationally
recognized third party independent auditing firm and has implemented an
effective system... to prevent the use... of any UNRWA resources by any foreign
terrorist organization... Also includes a Sense-of- Congress resolution
(Section 803) that the President and the Secretary of State should lead a
high-level diplomatic effort to encourage other responsible nations to
withhold contributions to UNRWA,... until UNRWA has met the conditions
listed in... this Act; citizens of recognized states should be removed
from UNRWA's jurisdiction; UNRWA's definition of a Palestine refugee
should be changed to that used for a refugee by the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; and... responsibility for those
refugees should be fully transferred to the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees.
Result: Reported by Committee, died on the floor.
2012: First Kirk UNRWA Reporting Requirement Senate Report
112-085 - Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Bill, 2012.[45]
Directs the General Accounting Office "to submit a report assessing
(1) the ability of the Palestinian Authority to assume responsibility for
any of the programs and activities conducted by the U.N. Relief and Works
Agency in the West Bank; (2) actions required by the Palestinian
Authority in order to assume such responsibility; and (3) the opinion of
the Department of State and relevant ministries of the Government of
Israel, including the Ministry of Defense, on the viability of
transitioning such programs and activities from UNRWA to the Palestinian
Authority."
Result: GAO declined to provide the mandated report, and
told Senator Kirk's office it was advised by the State Department that it
is not possible to produce such a report.
2012: Second Kirk UNRWA Reporting Requirement requiring a
report on UNRWA's "refugee" definition, under the Protracted
Refugee Situations subheading in Senate Reports, 112–172, 113–81, and
113-195.[46]
Report language of the Senate Appropriations Committee directing the
Secretary of State to submit a report to the Committee indicating the
approximate number of people receiving UNRWA services "whose place
of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948 and who were
displaced as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict" versus the
number "who are descendants of [such] persons."
Result: The State Department has declined to provide the
mandated report. In a letter to the subcommittee, Deputy Secretary of
State Thomas Nides objected, asserting that this requirement would be
"viewed around the world as the United States acting to prejudge and
determine the outcome of this sensitive issue."[47]
2013: H.R.1337 Palestine Accountability Act Introduced in House
(03/21/2013) (Rep. DeSantis, Ron [R-FL-6] Mr. Culberson, Mr. Sam Johnson
of Texas, Mr. Pitts, Mr. Flores, Mr. King of Iowa, and Mr. Franks of
Arizona). Prohibits funds from being obligated or expended for U.S.
contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) unless: (1) a U.S. nongovernmental or
private entity audits the UNRWA budget and the Secretary submits the
audit to Congress, and (2) the Secretary certifies to Congress that UNRWA
meets specified requirements. SEC. 5. Prohibition on United States
Contributions to UNRWA. (a) In General. --No funds available to any
United States Government department or agency for any fiscal year may be
obligated or expended with respect to making contributions to the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA) unless with respect to such fiscal year -- (1) an independent
audit of the budget of UNRWA is conducted by a United States
nongovernmental or private organization or entity and the Secretary of
State submits such audit to Congress; and (2) the Secretary of State
certifies to Congress that UNRWA, at a minimum, meets the requirements
applicable to the Palestinian Authority under paragraphs (1) to (3), (5),
and (7) of section 2(a) of this Act, except that for purposes of meeting
the requirements of paragraph (1) of such section, the term
"Palestinian Authority" shall be deemed to be
"UNRWA."
Result: Died in Committee.
2014: S. 2766: Palestinian and United Nations Anti-Terrorism Act of
2014, Section 6. Introduced by Marco Rubio on July 31, 2014 and sent
to committee.[48]
Amends Section 301(c) to prohibit aid to UNRWA unless the Secretary of
State certifies that no employee or beneficiary of UNRWA is a member of
Hamas or any terrorist group or has incited anti-Israel or anti-Semitic
propaganda; that no UNRWA facility is used for terrorist purposes; and
that UNRWA is subject to independent audits.
Result: None yet.
[1] For
an analysis of UNRWA's role in perpetuating the refugee issue as a source
of tension, see the present author's overview "Why a special issue on
UNRWA?" The Middle East Quarterly (2012).
[2]
Karen Abu Zayd, "UNRWA
needs support not brickbats," Middle East Monitor (April
1, 2012).
[3] Jim
Zanotti, "U.S.
Foreign Aid to the Palestinians," Congressional Research
Service, RS22967, July 3, 2014.
[4] Id.,
at 11-12.
[5] Exchange
of letters constituting a provisional agreement concerning assistance to
Palestinian Refugees, mfa.gov.il, June 14, 1967.
[6]
U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., 4th Committee, 22nd Meeting (PM), U.N. Doc
GA/SPD/442, (Nov. 1, 2009), available at http://www.un.org/press/en/2009/gaspd442.doc.htm
(last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
[7] Press
Release, "Success of UN Relief Agency for Palestine Refugees Also
Sign of Collective Failure to Resolve Political Question That Led to
Refugee Crisis, Fourth Committee Hears," UN, Press Release
GA/SPD/442 (Nov. 3, 2009), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gaspd442.doc.htm
(last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
[8] Supra
note 2.
[9]
Baruch Spiegel, "Jerusalem's
Surprisingly Good Relations with UNRWA," Middle East
Quarterly (2012) (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
[10] Supra
note 3.
[11]
U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign
Operations, FY2015 (Appendix 2), at 134.
[12]
Ron Csillag, "Canada
redirecting Palestinian aid from UNRWA," JTA (Jan. 14, 2010).
[13]
Lee Berthiaume, "Israel
asked Canada to reverse decision on funding for UN Palestinian refugee
agency," Embassy (July 6, 2011).
[14]
"Holland to
reconsider UNRWA funding," eajc.org (Dec. 12, 2011).
[15]
Reported in private email to the author (March 3, 2012).
[16]
Quoted in Al-Sabil (Jordan), Jan.11, 2014, available here (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
[17] E.g.,
U.S. Department of State, Migration and Refugee Assistance FY 2012,
available here
(last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
[18] http://www.unrwa.org/syria-crisis
(last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
[19] Chris
McGrath, Washington Liaison Officer at UNRWA, Linkedin.com
[20] Friends
of UNRWA Association Inc, Guidestar.org (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
[21] E.g.,
Letter from Deputy Secretary of State to Patrick J. Leahy (May 24, 2012),
available here
(last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
[22]
Josh Rogin, "Did
the State Department just create 5 million Palestinian refugees?"
Foreign Policy, (May 25, 2012).
[23]
Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality (last amended 1987) (January 1, 1954),
available here
(last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
[24]
INA Act 101(a), sec. 42, available here.
[25] http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?documentID=139882&version=1
(last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
[26] Department
of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Form
I-730, Refugee/Asylee Relative Petition, available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-730instr.pdf
(last visited Nov. 7, 2014). These rules are treated by American courts
as being as legally binding as statutory law, under the "reasonable
interpretation" test of the Chevron doctrine, as articulated by the
U.S. Supreme Court, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
[27] Supra
note 21.
[28] Supra
note 3, at 24.
[29] 8
U.S.C. §1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (2006), Sec. 208(b)(2)(A)(vi), available here.
[30]
The Palestinian Basic Law, art. 28. Available here.
[31] U.
S. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Palestine/Occupied
Territories: Information on passports issued by the Palestine National
Authority (Dec. 17, 1998), PAL99001.ZCH, available here.
[32] Remarks
by the President at the AIPAC Policy Conference, Whitehouse.gov, 2011.
[33] Clinton Proposal
on Israeli-Palestinian Peace (Dec. 23, 2000).
[34] Exchange
of letters between PM Sharon and President Bush (Apr. 14, 2004).
[35] H.
Con. Res. 460, 108 Cong. (2003-2004).
[36]
Steven J. Rosen and Daniel Pipes, "Lessening UNRWA's Damage,"
The Jerusalem Post, July 9, 2012.
[37]
U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Middle East,
Consolidated
Eligibility and Registration Instructions (last visited Nov. 7,
2014).
[38] See
Department of State and UNRWA Actions to Implement Section 301(c) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, GAO-04-276R (Nov. 17, 2003) available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-276R
(last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
[39] H.
Con. Res. 311, 108 Con. (2003), available at https://beta.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/311.
[40]
H.R. 5278, 109th Con. (2006) available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/hr5278/text/x(last
visited Nov. 7, 2014).
[41] H.
Con. Res. 29, 111Con. (2009) available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hconres29/text
(last visited Nov. 7, 2014) (previously offered as H. Con. Res. 428 in
2008, available at http://www.washingtonwatch.com/bills/show/110_HC_428.html
(last visited Nov. 7, 2014)).
[42]
H.R. 5065, 111th Con. (2010) available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr5065/text
(last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
[43] S.
1848, 11th Con. (2011) available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:SN01848:
(last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
[44] H.
R. 3155, 113th Con. (2013) available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3155/text.
[45] S.
Rep. 112-085, 112th Con. (2012) available here.
(last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
[46] Id.,
and also S. Rep. 113-195, 113th Con. (2014) available here,
and Daniel Pipes, "History of
the Kirk Amendment concerning UNRWA," 2012.
[47] Supra
note 20.
[48] S.
2766, 113th Con. (2013) available here.(last
visited Nov. 7, 2014).
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