Reading the Iran Deal
The serious flaws in the deal that have not received the public attention they deserve.
August 6, 2015
Reprinted from TimesofIsrael.com.
Author's note: Below is a shorter version of an essay I posted on the Iran deal. It examines the following serious flaws in the Iran deal some of which have not received the public attention they deserve.
Author's note: Below is a shorter version of an essay I posted on the Iran deal. It examines the following serious flaws in the Iran deal some of which have not received the public attention they deserve.
1. Treating the Islamic Republic of Iran as a normal country:
Nowhere in the full text of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
do the E3/EU +3 (Britain, France, Germany, United States, Russia, China
and the European Union) insist that Iran immediately cease its threats
to the United States and Israel, abandon the lies of Holocaust denial
and official anti-Semitism, release political prisoners and adopt
practices of human rights enshrined for example in the Helsinki
Agreements in the Soviet bloc in the 1980s. Why should anyone expect a
change of policy from an agreement that leaves unmentioned the
ideological fanaticism of the rulers in Tehran? Why should a strategy
that treats the Iranian regime as a normal state lead to a future of
regional and international peace and security? Is this not a reward to a
regime that has engaged in terrorism and threats to our allies and thus
an incentive to further acts of aggression?
2. The expanding 300 kg limit:
The agreement’s treatment of a supposed 300 kg. limit of highly
enriched uranium known as UF6 suggests that Iran can import its way to
the bomb. The text of the agreement clearly states that UF6 from Russia
or “other sources” will not be counted against the 300 kg limit. In
plain English this means that Iran may already have more than 300 kg of
UF6 and that in the future it may import even more, perhaps from Russia
or China, North Korea or Pakistan. The agreement indicates that the
exporting country and Iran — not the United States and the IAEAA — will
certify the acceptability of these imports. Again, this suggests a huge
loophole in the deal that makes it possible for Iran to import the
uranium needed to build nuclear bombs and that the inspections regime
described at Fordow, Natanz and Arak will completely miss these others
sources of the growth of Iran’s nuclear stockpile.
3. Knowledge transfer:
The creation of a center for nuclear research at Fordow and in the
project of modernize the nuclear reaction at Arak would appear to
enhance Iran’s path to the bomb by facilitating the transfer of
scientific and technical knowledge from the E3/EU + 3 signers to Iran.
It is a bizarre gift to a country that has been violating UN Security
Council resolutions for years. When scholars gather together, they talk
with one another. It is reasonable to assume that ether unintentionally
or as a result of espionage, Iran will gain significant knowledge it
would not otherwise gain. The scientists and engineers in these projects
will probably oppose giving nuclear secrets to Iran yet why assume that
Russian and Chinese scientists would take that view? Anti-Americanism
and hostility to Israel resonate in parts of the European universities?
Will they have no impact on the willingness of scientists and engineers
to aid Iran’s nuclear ambitions?
4.
Self-deterrence and the multilateral restraints of the JCPOA and the
very unlikely enforcement of the agreement in the event of Iranian
violations.
The JCPOA builds
into the agreement a set of multilateral institutions and vested
interests that place significant barriers in the way of an American
“snap-back” of sanctions or an American military strike in the event of
Iranian violations. They make effective enforcement of the agreement
highly unlikely if not impossible.
First, the growing economic presence in Iran not only of Russia and
China but of our European allies including Britain, France and
Germany — and presumably many other countries around the world — creates
multiple vested interests in preservation of the nuclear agreement even
in the face of Iranian violations. In the event of disputes, a growing
body of countries will have a vested interest in giving Iran the benefit
of the doubt and opposing enforcement measures. The agreement, with a
veto of Russia, China and Iran in mind, stipulated that only five of
eight members of the Joint Working Group are needed to declare Iran in
violation of the accord. Yet given the vested interests of our European
allies, it is conceivable that the United States could find itself
outvoted by a majority that included some or all of our European allies.
Second, the presence of increasing numbers of engineers and scientists
from the P5+1 countries s and perhaps many others as well at Fordow and
Arak also create possibilities for Iranian espionage. In the event of
violations, Iran could use these scientists and engineers as hostages or
human shields to deter an American snap-back of sanctions or military
strike. The President of the United States could face a hostage
situation including citizens of many countries, including our allies
that would also intensify opposition to anything so “rash” as to
snap-back the sanctions or strike from the air thus endangering the
lives of many engineers and scientists from many countries, both friends
and allies.
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