Thwarted
Canadian Terrorist Attack Still Raises Questions
by Scott Newark
Special to IPT News
August 15, 2016
|
|
|
|
|
Share:  
|
  Be the
first of your friends to like this.
Note: This is a modified version of an article written for Frontline
Security magazine. See the original here.
 Last week's
successful prevention of a terrorist attack merits Canadians' appreciation
for the effective work of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Ontario
Provincial Police and local police. Thanks are also due to the FBI, which
alerted the RCMP Wednesday morning after learning of an online jihadi video
pledging allegiance to ISIS and announcing his
murderous intent.
The RCMP was then able to identify self-professed Muslim convert and
would-be jihadi Aaron Driver from Strathroy, Ontario, in part,
reportedly, through face recognition biometric technology. Driver was
already subject to a court ordered terrorism "peace bond" which was imposed followed his June
2015 arrest in Winnipeg for suspected terrorist connections.
It was clear from his own social media postings and connections that he
supported Islamist terrorism, including the Parliament Hill attack in
October 2014.
The effectiveness of the peace bond, as well as other systemic issues,
are now being questioned even as Canadians recognize the excellent work
done by the RCMP and other police agencies that thwarted this intended mass
murder. Also worth noting was the candid and substantive media briefing the
day after the takedown of Driver provided by RCMP Deputy Commissioner Mike
Cabana and Assistant Commissioner Jennifer Strachan. It is clear that under
Deputy Commissioner Cabana's leadership, effective Canada-U.S.
relationships exist and that immediate operational response is in a
deployment ready status. The importance of this cannot be overstated
because, unlike the traditional criminal justice world, success in counter
terrorism is measured in prevention and not just prosecution.
Post-incident review and operational investigations are underway, but
the event clearly raises a number of systemic issues that also merit
analysis. To be clear: this should not be a finger pointing exercise, but
rather one that explores what happened, or what didn't, and why, to
determine if improvements can be made. One thing is certain, the domestic
Islamist terrorist threat in Canada remains real and thus must be
pragmatically addressed.
Listed below are issues that merit consideration:
- Why was the
FBI able to detect the video while the RCMP/CSIS were not, and is
there a joint Canada-U.S. national security 'bad guy' database
supported by face recognition biometrics?
- Why was the
RCMP unable to detect if Driver was on the internet/social media?
- Does the
RCMP have face recognition biometrics technology and a national
security database to identify persons of interest? If so, does it
include people on terrorism peace bonds, identified jihadis, etc...?
- Are the
conditions of preventive peace bonds issued by courts practically
enforceable and effective? Is appropriate consideration given to
seeking residency restrictions to avoid community placement without
public notice?
- Driver was
originally ordered to wear an electronic monitoring device after his
arrest last year, but it was removed by the Court in February when
the peace bond conditions were finalized. Would the monitoring have
helped authorities detect Driver's acquisition of explosive
equipment?
- Was the
ongoing supervision of Driver sufficient, and was RCMP aware of and
okay with him attending the identified local mosque?
- Did Driver
have a second explosive device?
- Were RCMP
able to intercept Driver's communications while awaiting takedown?
- Why was the
RCMP unable to decrypt previously intercepted social media to reveal,
not only who he was communicating with, but what was being said?
- How was
Driver radicalized? Are efforts underway to identify and incapacitate
such groups/methods?
Ironically, all of these issues would be appropriate for in-camera
hearings conducted by the proposed Parliamentary National Security
Committee, as proposed in legislation which is currently before Parliament.
Whatever the forum, these questions need to be asked...and answered.
Scott Newark is a former Alberta Crown Prosecutor who has also served
as Executive Officer of the Canadian Police Association, Vice Chair of the
Ontario Office for Victims of Crime, Director of Operations to the
Washington D.C.-based Investigative Project on Terrorism and as a Security
Policy Advisor to the Governments of Ontario and Canada
U.S.
Border Security Issues Piling Up For New Canadian Government
by Scott Newark
Special to IPT News
August 15, 2016
|
|
|
|
|
Share:
|
Be the
first of your friends to like this.
Note: This is a modified version of an article written for Frontline
Security magazine. See the original here.
 When Canada's new
government assumed office almost nine months ago, it was clear that it had
new policy priorities and that it was specifically intent on a more
inclusive and consultative process for decision making than its
predecessor. Some skeptics, myself included, cautioned that while this was
understandable, governing was about making choices and taking action and
not just holding media events to celebrate "inclusion" and
"outreach." Put differently, governing is more difficult than
campaigning but that's what governments are elected to do.
This substantive lack of progress is evident in a number of areas and as
we prepare for the return of Parliament in September, Canada-U.S. border
security is clearly an area where specific actions are required. This is
true, not only because of the inherent priority of the joint border for
both counties, but also because of a changing security focused world and
the need to deliver on existing border security focused commitments.
Additionally, although it is sometimes taken for granted, Canada-U.S.
relations are our highest foreign policy priority and border security
issues are a central part of that discussion.
Canada remains a signatory to the Beyond the Border Agreement (BTB) with
the U.S. which, wisely, has very specific commitments that includes
timelines which are now not being met. Perhaps the most important of these
was for the joint assessment of border gaps and vulnerabilities (completed)
and a commitment to address them through a joint technology procurement and
deployment process.
It appeared this might be happening in 2013 when the federal government
announced a $92 million allocation to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(RCMP) to deploy sensor technology at the Canada-U.S. border from
Quebec/Maine to Oakville as part of its "Anti-Tobacco Smuggling"
strategy. A year later, with no action taken, this funding was re-announced
by the RCMP as the "Border Integrity Technology Enhancement
Program" (BITEP). Yet almost two years later, BITEP remains an acronym
and not a deployed action.
The importance of this failure to deploy sensor surveillance technology
along the Canada-U.S. border cannot be overstated. Without it, Canada and
the U.S. face increased risk of cross border smuggling of weapons, drugs,
tobacco and people. In today's world, that's an unacceptable risk and
what's required is action, not repetitive "consultation" or more
RCMP navel gazing.
As part of the BTB Agreement, Canada also committed to implement a Pre
Border Clearance Agreement with the U.S. It appears that the bill will
provide the necessary legal authorizations which have been worked out for
Canadian and U.S. officers to conduct pre-screenings in each other's
countries including the taking of biometric identification, all of which is
expected to expedite legitimate trade and travel.
Less clear is whether the RCMP has finally created a national security
based face recognition biometric database which can identify security
threats who are using altered or counterfeit identification. In today's
world of departing and returning jihadis, not having this detection
capability deployed is simply unacceptable. The need for this specialized
screening is also implicit in several announced border security initiatives
including the modernized "No Fly" database, the Advanced
Passenger Information initiative for screening at airports before
departure to Canada and the Electronic Travel Authorization for screening
of persons from select visa exempt counties. All of these programs need to
be scrutinized by the new government to make sure the intended outcomes are
actually occurring.
While a joint Canada-U.S. database is the obvious starting point, in
today's travel facilitated world it will be necessary to expand the
database to trusted allies such as the other "Five Eyes" partners
(United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia) as well as the EU and others.
Parliament also has another bill before it which will implement the
Exit-Entry information sharing agreement between Canada and the U.S. that
is part of the BTB Agreement. The bill would expand the existing
information-sharing about non-citizens entering and exiting each other's
countries to cover all travelers, including to Canadian and U.S. citizens.
This will increase awareness of travel activity by people of interest,
including those with outstanding arrest warrants.
Unfortunately, it appears this information will only be used for records
reconciliation rather than for entry decisions. This application use should
be monitored as we will want to ensure the data is not being used to
"detect" the departure of non-citizens who have non-appearance
warrants outstanding (reported by the Auditor General at the embarrassingly
high number of 44,000) so that the warrants are removed from the system
without a concurrent requirement to create an inadmissibility status to
prevent such persons from re-entering Canada.
Both Pre Border Clearance and Exit-Entry will require restoring CBSA
personnel resources, especially in the Intelligence and Operations units
which were cut as a result of the 2010 Deficit Reduction Action Plan
(DRAP). Security programs without sufficient personnel don't deliver the
results intended...and promised.
In addition to this already lengthy list of border security issues, the
new government appears intent on implementing a new border crossing process
for the Akwasasne Mohawks near Cornwall. For decades, the Canadian port of
entry was on the Akwasasne reserve on Cornwall Island, but that changed
when the Mohawk Band Council (and "Warriors") objected, with
protests and threats of violence, to CBSA officers being armed on what they
claim as their "territory." The port of entry was moved to
Cornwall, which created an obvious inconvenience to Island residents
returning to Canada from the U.S. as they had to drive across the Island to
report in.
Several weeks ago, the Senate Committee on Aboriginal Affairs produced a
special report to the government on the issue, citing the historical Jay
Treaty from 1794 to justify the need for a special identification program
to allow Akwasasne Mohawks to travel between Canada and the U.S. This issue
has significant border security ramifications for both countries due to the
acknowledged high volume of drug, weapons, human and tobacco smuggling in
the area. The BTB Agreement created a December 2012 deadline for completing
negotiations to create a pre clearance facility in Massena, N.Y. and
implementing that would be a far better solution than the Senate
committee's proposal.
Cross border smuggling requires the deployment of analytical radar
surveillance systems in any plan. Simply detecting the target isn't enough;
interdicting it is. That means deploying sufficient operational resources
which means cross border operations and finally including CBSA officers in
the Shiprider program and full enforcement operations between ports of
entry.
Finally, Canada has made a number of new border related commitments as a
result of its recent summit with the U.S. and Mexico. These include trade
and travel enhancements such as including Mexico in the trusted traveller
program, expanding the Single Window Initiative to facilitate Mexican
imports to Canada and working together to align commercial clearance
practices.
The commitments also include having the three countries create a joint
database with practices to detect and interdict "foreign fugitives
with known or suspected ties to North America." This kind of a
targeted "bad guy lookout" system has long been advocated and
presumably it will have both criminality and security components and,
hopefully, be supported by face-recognition biometrics because bad guys
don't always use their real ID.
Immediately prior to the summit, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced
that the Canadian visa requirement on Mexican travelers, which was imposed
in 2007, will be lifted by the end of the year. While this was presented,
and reported, as a reversal of a mean-spirited action by the previous
Harper government, there has been little consideration of why the visa
restriction was imposed in the first place. In essence, following 9/11 and
a U.S. crackdown on people illegally in their country, the government of
Ontario raised the issue of clearly bogus refugee claimants entering Canada
at land ports of entry from the U.S. where they made refugee claims. This
resulted in their admission and a huge financial burden on the system. In
truth, these people were not at risk while in the United States and, for a
number of reasons, like better welfare and free health care, preferred
being "refugees" in Canada. Ontario proposed a "Safe Third
Country Agreement" where people making such claims at land ports of
entry were returned either to Canada or the U.S. from where they had
arrived and sought entry.
Initially, the then-Liberal federal government resisted this initiative,
which was part of a larger Perimeter Security Strategy, which (full
disclosure), I helped draft. This seemingly changed over time as Ottawa
took over negotiations and the Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement was
enacted (with supporting Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
regulations) in 2004.
The issue resurfaced in 2007, when, southwestern Ontario became flooded
with thousands of Mexican refugee claimants following another U.S.
crackdown on people illegally in the U.S. They were allowed to stay despite
the Safe Third Country Agreement designed to prevent this. A review of the
agreement's fine print revealed that the U.S. Department of Justice created
an exception for people who were citizens of countries without a visa
requirement to enter Canada which, in 2007, included Mexico. That was the
reason that the previous government imposed the visa requirement. It
worked. The flood of bogus Mexican refugee claimants seeking entry to
Canada from the United States stopped almost immediately and has not
re-occurred.
If the Trudeau government lifts the visa requirement without some
modification to the Safe Third Country Agreement and the IRPA Regulation,
we will be re-opening the door to a problem that was fixed. Rest assured
that the financial and systemic performance consequences to the refugee
system will be enormous, especially if Donald Trump becomes president and
Mexicans illegally in the U.S. seek to avoid deportation.
In summary, there are a significant number of border security issues
that require substantive choices and action from the new government rather
than consultation or review. The good news is that since his appointment in
November 2015, Public Safety Minister Ralph Goodale has shown a repeated
inclination for that kind of pragmatic approach, including wanting to know
the facts and holding agency heads to account. That's called leadership and
it is needed now on the critically important border security and
Canada-U.S. files.
Scott Newark is a former Alberta Crown Prosecutor who has also served
as Executive Officer of the Canadian Police Association, Vice Chair of the
Ontario Office for Victims of Crime, Director of Operations to the
Washington D.C.-based Investigative Project on Terrorism and as a Security
Policy Advisor to the Governments of Ontario and Canada
|
Print
Send
Comment
RSS
Posts
No comments:
Post a Comment